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Theories of Choice 
In Relation to Farmer Decisions! 
BY JOHN L. DILLON AND EARL O. HEADY 
Farmers make decisions in an uncertain environ-
ment. Within a given year, weather and, consequent-
ly, yield are uncertain-even though more perfect 
knowledge exists relative to the mean, distribution 
and other statistics of yield over a period of years. 
Prices, especially for livestock where little govern-
ment stabilization is provided, are particularly vari-
able and give rise to difficulty of optimum choice. 
In addition to these main sources of uncertainty, 
many farmers are also faced with uncertainties stem-
ming from personal and group relationships. An ex-
ample of the latter is the length and conditions of 
tenure on rented farms. 
Within this environment of uncertainty, farmers 
must make choices of the combinations of crop and 
livestock products to produce, the farm practices and 
resource mixes to employ, the scale of operations 
and capital investment and other decisions which lead 
to profits or losses. 'Vhile the decision environment 
is highly uncertain, recommendations to farmers on 
physical practices and economic organization are 
often, and perhaps even typically, made as if the 
future were known with absolute certainty. Over the 
previous two decades, however, certain theories were 
developed which recognized the existence of uncer-
tainty in economic choice. These theories generally 
supposed that subjective notions or expectations were 
formulated with respect to future events, and that 
decision makers formulated choices accordingly-using 
various precautionary measures to conform with the 
degree of uncertainty and their ability to withstand the 
risks attached to unfavorable outcomes. More recently, 
theories of choice have been developed which suppose 
much less knowledge, or subjective anticipation, of 
the probability of· future events. These theories of 
choice, or models for decisions under absolute un-
certainty, define strategies which can be used by 
decision makers when they assume meager or no 
knowledge about likelihood of outcome of alternative 
future events. 
Some of the latter theories might have promise in 
application to decisions by farm managers (a) in the 
normative sense of explaining the types of decisions 
which should be made, relative to the particular goals 
1 Project 1135 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experi-
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of the farmer and his family and his decision environ-
ment as it affects the degree of conservatism in 
choices and (b) in a descriptive sense of explaining the 
methods and procedures used in making decisions 
when the outcome is uncertain. The purpose of this 
study is to examine decision models or choice theories 
as they might apply, in both senses, to choice of 
farmers. 
Development and application of useful decision 
models could be of extreme importance to farming. 
Individual farmers typically make their own decisions 
without aid of a staff of assistants and with the full 
financial burden of outcomes falling upon themselves. 
Hence, if decision models which correspond to the 
decision environment (i.e., capital position, family 
responsibilities, degree of uncertainty, risk aversion 
and other characteristics conditioning the farmer's 
willingness to take chances in his choices) could be 
developed, they would cause research findings and 
educational recommendations to gain wider accept-
ance and greater application to the individual's silua-
tion. But for such choice theories to have practical 
application, they must correspond roughly to the pro-
cedure which farmers can and do use. Hence, thi!; 
study has the twin objectives of (1) determining the 
degree of correspondence between the procedures 
farmers use in making decisions and various choice 
theories and (2) specifying situations in which farm-
ers would be better off in using alternative models, 
as compared with the methods currently used. 
This study is of general methodological nature. It 
is restricted to a particular set of decisions>-namely, 
choices with respect to cattle feeding over the eco-
nomic horizon of a single year. It also refers to a 
particular age, tenure and geographic strata of farm 
m::.nagers. It has been so restricted because it is an 
initial investigation relating formal choice theories to 
farmer decisions. 
The discussion which follows refers to Nature. 
This term is used in the convention of game theoretic 
models. It refers not only to weather but also to other 
things, persons and groups which "serve as an op-
ponent" of the farmer in causing his choices to have 
different degrees of success. Use of the term Nature 
thus eliminates the need for continued redefinition of 
the persons or things for which farmers must develop 
strategies in decisions. 
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THEORIES OF CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertaint)r prevails when the decision maker has 
no obj~ctive knowledge about the probability of oc-
currence of the various possible states of Nature. 
While he may know Natures possible alternatives, 
he knows nothing about tile probabilities of each 
event or alternative. In recent years, theories of de-
cision making have been developed to treat such 
circumstances. Theories of Wald,2 Savage,3 Laplace4 
and Hurwiczli are examples and will be outlined first. 
The more general theories of decision making of 
Simon6 and Shackle,7 as they relate to absolute un-
certainty, then will be described. The discussion which 
follows will be in terms of a generalized payoff matrix 
such as that shown later. 
DECISION THEOIUES SPECIFIC TO PROBLEMS OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
The theories in this group have a number of com-
mon features. They are not general theories, but each 
provides a mathematical algorithm for selecting the 
best act or choice. The best act is defined tautological-
ly as that selected by the algorithm. Also, they are 
rational theories to the extent of being mathematically 
well-defined and objective. The postulated algorithm 
in each case is precise and never leads, given the end 
of profit maximization and the decision maker's 
problem setting, to ambiguous selections under a 
given set of circumstances. 
There are no a priori theoretical grounds for select-
ing one of these theories over another. The preferred 
algorithm depends on the decision maker's psycho-
logical make-up, judgement and problem setting. 
Hence, there is no single best mathematical pro-
cedure for solving a decision problem under un-
certainty. An infinite number of algorithms are pos-
sible, but it is doubtful whether criteria more plaus-
ible than those discussed here are useful for norma-
tive analysis of empirical situations. Too, those ex-
plained are not so complex that it would be im-
possible for them to describe procedures of farm 
decision makers. 
W ALD CRITERION 
The Wald, or maximin, criterion provides for selec-
tion of that act or strategy which has the maximum 
minimum payoff. A pure act· refers to selection of a 
single course of action, such as planting a single crop 
variety or feeding only one kind of cattle. If a mixed 
strategy-the selection of a combination of altermtives 
• Wald, A. Statistical decision functions. Wiley and Sons, New York. 
1950. 
• Savage, L. J. The theory of statistical decisions. Jour. Arner. Stat. 
Assoc. 48: 238-248. 
• Reported in Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H. Games IUld decisions: intro-
duction IUld critical survey. Wiley and Sons, New York. 1957. pp. 102-
124. 
• Hurwicz, Leo. Optimality criteria for decision moking under ignorance. 
Cowles Commission Paper. No. 355. Chicago. (mimeo.) 1951. 
• Simon, H. A. Models of man. Wiley IUld Sons, New York. 1957. 
• Shackle. G. L. S. E~l'ectntion. in economics. Cambridge University 
Press, London. 1949. 
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such as feeding several classes of cattle-is permissible 
and if the payoff matrix has no saddle point, then 
that mixture of strategies should be chosen which has 
the maximum minimum expected payoff. A saddle-
point refers to a matrix of strategies and payoffs which 
specifies selection of a single course of action. This 
criterion is equivalent to treating the problem as a. 
two-person zero-sum game as outlined by Heady and 
Candler,S a procedure that assumes that the worst 
possible result will occur. Hence, the maximum mini-
mum refers to selecting the strategy or act, or mixture 
of these, which will minimize loss if we suppose that 
Nature will do its worst or which will provide the 
maximum profit outcome when it is supposed that 
Nature will cause losses to be tile minimum possible. 
Since Nature actually is playing a passive role and 
not actively trying to defeat the decision maker, the 
Wald theory is extremely conservative. In a manner, 
the Wald criterion selects a set of strategies which 
will give the decision maker a given income with 
"smallest chance" attached to it. 
SAVAGE ORITEIUON 
This theory considers the regret that might be felt 
after the true state of Nature is known and it is 
realized that a larger payoff might have been obtained 
had a different choice been selected. The procedure-
provides a solution to minimize this regret. To this 
end a new payoff matrix, termed the risk or regret 
payoff matrix, is constructed from the actual payoff 
matrix Iau]. Each element, rlj, of the regret matrix 
Irlj] is the amount that would have to be added to 
the original element alj in order to equal the maximum 
payoff in the jth column. Thus 
( 1) rlJ = maXjalj - au . 
Where only pure acts may be selected, the Savage 
criterion specifies that act which minimizes tile maxi-
mum regret. If the regret matrix has no saddle point 
and mixed strategies are permissible, that mixture 
of acts which minimizes the maximum expected regret 
is chosen. Like the Wald theory, the Savage criterion 
is conservative in assuming that the worst, the largest 
possible regret, will occur. 
HURWICZ CRITEIUON 
The Hurwicz criterion, sometimes known as the 
pessimism-optimism index, considers both the best 
and the worst payoffs for each act. It is of the follow-
ing form as proposed by Hurwicz: Let {3, a fixed 
number between 0 and 1, denote the decision maker's 
level of pessimism. With each act or COurse of action 
Alo associate the index {3 minjalJ + (1 - (3) maxjalj. 
That act should then be chosen which maximizes this 
index. If the decision maker has no optimism, then 
we have {3 = L The procedure then is equivalent to 
Wald's criterion. Thus the Wald theory is a special 
case of the Hurwicz theory. 
• Hendy, Earl O. and Candler, Wilfred V. Linenr programming methods. 
Iowa State University Press. Ames, Iowa. 1958. eh. 14. 
LAPLACE CRITERION 
The Laplace prinicple of insufficient reason is the 
oldest of all the decision theories. It specifies that 
since information about the likelihood of OCCUITence 
of the various possible states of Nature is zero, the 
decision maker should act as though each of Nature's 
states has an equal chance of being the true state, 
the state to be realized. The expected utility associat-
m 
ed with act Ai 0 is therefore :s aij/m where m is the 
j=l 
number of possible states of Nature. The act which 
has the largest expected utility should be chosen. 
THE SAVAGE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY THEORY 
Savage9 has developed a second theory, not to be 
confused with his minimax regret criterion. The later 
theory shows how subjective a priori probabilities 
may be attached to the various states of Nature under 
absolute uncertainty. The later theory postulates that a 
complete preference ordering of all acts exists for the 
decision maker, apart from any consideration of the 
payoffs relevant to each act. Under these conditions, 
an optimal set of subjective probabilities could be 
attached to Nature's states. The decision problem 
then can be handled in subjective terms as a risk 
problem, provided only that the expected value of the 
payoff distributions are considered by the decision 
maker. It is a normative approach. A decision maker 
following this logic would base his choice on maxi-
mization of the expected utility of the consequences, 
such utility being derived not only from the payoff 
itself, but also from his preference for each COurse 
of action or act apart from its payoff. The Savage 
theory allows for the fact that utility need not be 
derived solely from money income. 
THE SL.'dON THEORY OF THE SATISFICER 
Simon10 postulates that in complex situations of 
the real world, the decision maker Simplifies the 
problem by considering not all possible alternatives 
but only some subset which is commensurate with his 
capabilities of solution. He also assumes that the 
decision maker behaves as a "satisficer," seeking a 
course of action that is "good enough," rather than 
as a "maximizer" seeking the best possible course 
of action: The decision maker has some aspiration 
level which he tries to attain. An act whose outcome 
may lie below this level is regarded as unsatisfactory. 
In a given situation there may be a number of satis-
factory considered acts. The first one of these to be 
studied mayor may not be accepted. So long as the 
chosen act meets the aspiration level of the decision 
maker, he is behaving in whlt Simon terms an in-
tendedly rational manner. This theory is descriptive 
and not normative (i.e., it attempts to explain only 
how decision makers do act, and not how they should 
act). 
• Savage, L. J. Foundations of statistics. Wiley and Sons, New York. 1954 
,0 Simon, 0Jl. cit. 
THE SHACKLE THEORY OF POTENTIAL SURPRISE AND 
FOCUS OUTCOME 
Shacklell stresses psychological variables and has 
postulated a theory of decision making for nondivis-
ible nonseriable situations-decision situations where 
actuarially certain outcomes cannot be assigned. 
Shackle doubts that the use of mathematical probabil-
ity by ordinary decision makers is logical and sub-
stitutes possibility, or degrees of belief, in its place. 
Shackle's degree of belief concept becomes operational 
in his theory through its relationship to potential 
surprise. The degree of belief a decision maker feels in 
a possible outcome is defined as corresponding 
uniquely to the degree of surprise which he feels 
himself exposed to if that outcome should occur. -= 
In making a decision, Shackle postulates that the 
decision maker considers each possible outcome in 
relation to its potential surprise, sighting for each 
act what he terms a focus gain-focus loss pair of 
outcomes. Following other literature, we will consider 
focus best-focus worst pairs. These are the "good" 
and "bad" outcomes for each act which, when taken 
in conjunction with their associated potential surprise, 
have the greatest attention-arresting power. By some 
conscious or subconscious method these pairs are 
standardized in terms of utility. The standardized 
pairs, one set for each act, then are evaluated, perhaps 
intuitively, on the decision maker's gambling indiffer-
ence system. The act whose standardized focus out-
come pair lies highest on this loss versus p;ain in-
difference system then will be selected as the best 
act. Shackle's theory is purely descriptive and has 
no normative intent. 
APPLICATION TO A SI~IPLE PROBLEM 
To illustrate selection of acts under the various 
decision theory criteria and to illustrate differences 
in selected acts or courses of action, we resort to a 
simple algebraic example. It will have particular 
reference in the empirical analysis of this section. The 
payoff matrix resulting from the choices open to the 
decision maker (the left-hand column or AI rows) 
and the possible acts of Nature (the right-hand or 
Sj columns) is as follows: 
Decision maker"s States of Nature 
alternatives S, s. S. S. 
A, 2,500 3,500 0 1,500 (2) A. 1,500 2,000 500 1,000 A. 0 6,000 0 0 A. 1,500 4,500 0 0 
W ALD CRITERION 
Using this algorithm, that act or co:nbination of 
acts is selected which has the maximum minimum 
payoff. Inspection of the matrix shows that a saddle 
point exists at the a23 position with a payoff of 500. 
Hence, A2 should be selected. This course is selected 
because the Wald criterion assumes that Nature will 
"do its worst" (column S3) and the decision maker 
will "select the best" (row A2) in this column. Where 
" Shackle, 0Jl. cit. 
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a saddle point does not exist, he will select a com-
bination of strategies or rows. But an example of 
this type is not necessary for illustrating differences 
in game theoretic criteria. 
SAVAGE CRITERION 
When this criterion is used, the aim is to minimize 
the maximum regret that may be felt ex post. To this 
end, the regret matrix is calculated as indicated in 
equation 1. Hence, we have for [rlj] 
(3) [
1,008 
2,500 
1,000 
2,500 
4,000 
o 
1,500 
500 
o 
500 
500 
0] 500 1,500 
1,500 
where each element in each column of the payoff mat-
rix (2) is subtracted from the largest alj of that 
column. 
H only pure strategies are allowed, A4 must be 
selected, for its maximum regret of 1,500, in any 
column, is smaller than that for any other act (row). 
With mixed strategies permitted, the decision maker 
should use rows AI, As, A4 , allocating his resources 
among them in the proportions of 9 : 23 : 68, re-
spectively.12 With such a mixed strategy, his maximum 
expected regret would be 1,365, or less than for a 
single act. 
HURWICZ CRITERION 
The choice under this algorithm is the act for which 
the value of (P minjalj + (1 - ,B) maxjalj) is a maxi-
mum, remembering that f3 is an index of the decision 
maker's level of pessimism and lies between zero and 
one. The minimum and maximum payoff values for 
each act, rows in the payoff matrix (2), are: 
Ai 0, 3,500 
A!! 500, 2,000 
As 0, 6,000 
A4 0, 4,500 
Since the minimum-maximum payoff pair for As 
dominates (has better outcomes and none worse than) 
those of Ai and A .. , the choice will always lie be-
tween A2 and A3, regardless of the size of f3. Which 
;act out of A2 and As should be selected depends on 
the value of f3. 
H 
(4) f3 (500) + (1-f3)2,000 > {3(O) + (I-B) 
6,000 which implies 
(5) {3 > 8/9, 
then A:.! should be selected. If the inequality in equa-
tion 4 is reversed, we find that for 
(6) {3 < 8/9 . 
As should be selected. When 
(7) {3 = 8/9 
,2 This solution is obtained by analyzing the negative regret matrix as a 
linear programming problem. Heady (Application of game thoory in 
agricultural economics. Canadian Jour. Agr. Econ. May 1958.) has 
illustrated the method. 
908 
either A2 or As, or some mixture of these two acts, 
should be selected. 
LAPLACE CRITERION 
Since there are four possible states of Nature in 
the payoff matrix (2), the principle of insufficient 
reason says that a probability of 0.25 should be given 
to each of these states. The expected value of each 
act, average across columns, is then: 
1,875 
1,250 
1,500 
1,500 
Al has the maximum expected value and should be 
selected. 
SIMON'S SATlSFlCER THEORY 
If the decision maker had an aspiration level of 
zero, he would be satisfied with any of the four acts 
available. All of them guarantee at least a zero payoff. 
With an aspiration level greater than zero, A2 must 
be selected, since this row has no zeroes; A2 is still 
the best act even if the aspiration level is greater 
than 500. 
SHACKLE'S THEORY OF POTENTIAL SURPRISE 
AND Focus OUTCOMES 
Since absolute uncertainty prevails, the standard--
ized focus outcomes are simply the pairs of best and 
worst payoffs for each act. Inspection shows that they· 
are: 
Al 3,500, 0 
A2 2,000, 500 
As 6,000, 0 
A-I 4,500, 0 
Acts Al and A4 are dominated by As; the latter 
has better outcomes and none worse. The choice, 
therefore, lies between A2 and As, since the worst 
outcome for A2 is not as bad as that of Aa. Which of 
these should be selected depends on the decision 
maker's gambling indifference system. The greater 
his disposition to gamble, the more likely it is that 
As would be selected; the smaller this disposition, the 
greater the chance that A2 would be chosen. At any 
rate, either A2 or As must be selected. Alar A .. 
should never be selected. 
Hence, different outcomes would be selected de-
pending on the decision maker's psychological state 
and his direct goals. With these consistent to various 
criteria, the decision with respect to the payoff matrix 
(2) would be A2 for Wald, At for Savage regret and 
pure strategies, 0.09AI + O.2SAs + 0.68A4 for Savage 
regret with mixed strategies, As when f3 of Hurwicz is 
less than 8/9 but A2 when {3 is greater than 8/9, Al 
for the Laplace criterion, any of the four or A2 for 
the Simon cliterion depending on the aspiration level 
and A2 or Aa for the Shackle approach. 
SOURCE AND COLLECTION OF THE DATA 
We analyzed decisions made by a group of Iowa 
farmers with respect to cattle feeding to determine 
the extent to which these decisions correspond to the 
game theoretic models previously outlined. The group 
of farmers studied, of course, had no knowledge 
about formal decision criteria or the computations 
necessary for their solution. The procedures which 
they follow in choices or decisions, however, must 
correspond to these or other decision models. Hence, 
it should be possible to examine actual decisions and 
determine which of the models, although even un~ 
wittingly, various strata of farmers most nearly use. 
The data to be analyzed were collected in the 
course of a four~stage panel survey. A population of 
77 farmers constituted this panel. The survey was 
primarily oriented to farmer price expectations and 
decisions on cattle feeding made relative to them. 
Discussions were held with each farmer in June, 
August and October of 1957 and in January 1958. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE POPULATION 
The population consisted of farmers who: (1) were 
farming in Marshall County, Iowa; (2) were between 
30 and 50 years of age in June 1957; (3) had owned 
and operated at least 80 acres of farmland during 
the 3 years prior to June 1957; (4) h:ld fed an average 
of at least 25 feeder cattle in each of the three feed~ 
ing seasons prior to the survey; and (5) had cooperat~ 
ed in all stages of the survey. Restrictions 1 to 4 were 
aimed at controlling possible tenure and age effects 
and guaranteeing that respondents occupied a. d~ 
dsion~making role and had more than a modICum 
of experience in the feeder-cattle operation. The re~ 
strictions were used to help insure a more homo-
geneous group for analysis with respect to decision 
making. 
The means of some selected characteristics of the 
respondents are listed in table 1. The left side column 
of figures refers to the population of 77 farmers. 
Included in this population are two farmers who had 
exh'emely large farm businesses relative to the other 
members of the population. In terms of acres operat-
ed, capital invested and gross income, their farm 
operation was twice the size of that of any other 
member of the llopulation. The means of the selected 
characteristics therefore are also/resented, in table 1, 
with these two farmers exclude . 
Considerable variation existed among the 77 farmers 
in certain characteristics. Five of the 77 were pro~ 
fessional men who had invested in farming while still 
maintaining their professional practices. Two devoted 
the majority of their time to small~town businesses. 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTCS DE~ 
SCRIBING THE RESPONDENTS. 
Mean 
Chamcteristic Unit 77 fanners 
Age . .. . ............ year 42.1 
Dependents .......... number 3.6 
Fonnal education ...... year 11.6 
Land operated ........ acre 291.4 
Capital .............. $1,000 1~3.6 
Equity .... . ...... percent 8.4 
• Two fanners with extremely large fanns excluded. 
75 fanners" 
42.1 
3.6 
11.5 
260.2 
108.5 
86.5 
Two operated large seed com plants, and one farmed 
as a sideline to general contract work. Only one 
farmer worked part time as a nonfarm laborer. At 
least 1 year of college had been completed by 17 of 
the farmers, while 20 of the 77 had not completed 
high school. Some rented land was farmed by 24 of 
the farmers. Sixteen had an equity of 100 percent. 
Further details of the personal, financial and farm 
organization characteristics of the population are pre-
sented in Appendix A. 
SURVEY PROCEDURES 
An initial sample of 120 farmers satisfying char~ 
acteristics 1 to 4 was drawn from a list developed 
from ACS data and farm interviews. Originally, the 
aim was to interview a random sample of 70 from 
the 120. An initial survey indicated that 95 of the 
120 farmers were eligible, while two additional mem~ 
bel'S of the population were found. Of these 97 farm~ 
ers 20 were not available or refused to cooperate at 
sor:.e stage of the survey. The number of cooperating 
farmers at each stage of survey was as follows: first 
stage, 85; second stage, 82; third stage, 77; and fourth 
stage, 77. Not all data from the four-stage survey are 
summarized in this manuscript. 
INTERVIEWER BIAS 
Because it was desired to complete each stage of 
the survey within the smallest possible time, three 
interviewers were used for the first survey, five for the 
second and three for the third. Three interviewers 
assisted in all three stages of personal contact. Before 
commencing field work, each interviewer was instruct-
ed in detail on the aims and implications both of 
each question he had to ask and of the over-all study 
and on the general conduct of an interview. All com-
pleted schedules were checke.d for irr~gularities. which 
might arise through intervIewer biaS or mIstakes. 
Where difficulties or inconsistencies existed, the re-
spondent was contacted aga~n and the query clar!fied. 
Through these techniques It was hoped that mter-
viewer bias was reduced to a minimum. 
A check on responses to one of the most important 
questions strongly indicates that interviewer bias was· 
not present. The data analyzed are shown in table 2 .. 
The question to which they relate is probably, of all 
those asked, the one most likely to be subject b 
interviewer bias. 
Bartlett's test for homogeneity of variance, as out-
lined by Snedecor,13 was applied to test whether the 
13 Snedecor, George. Statistical methods. Iowa State University Press. 
Ames, Iowa. 1947. p. 287. 
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES IN CATTLE FEEDING 
CONSIDERED BY FARMERS AS DETERMINED BY EACH INTER-
VIEWER. 
Inter-
viewer 
Number of alternatives 
considered 
A ... . 1, I, I, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5 
B ... I, I, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5, 8 
C ... I, I, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5 
D .... 1. 1, 1, 2, 2. 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 5. 7 
E .. I, I, I, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 7 
Number 
of 
fanners 
17 
17 
16 
14 
13 
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interviewing samples had the same population vari-
ance. This assumes a random distribution of respond-
ents among interviewers-an assumption that was not 
fully satisfied with regard to the geographic locations 
of the respondents within Marshall County. It does 
appear to be satisfied for other attributes of the re-
spondents. Bartlett's test was applied to a tranforma-
tion of the data. The transfonnation used was from 
x to (x+l)'h. This was done because counts of a 
discrete variable, such as the one considered here, 
tend to follow a Poisson distribution as Snedecor has 
noted. The test supported the hypothesis that the 
variances of the interviewer samples were not signifi-
cantly different. 
. The data were also tested to see whether significant 
dIfferences existed among the interviewers with re-
gard to the mean number of alternatives elicited by 
each. As for the previous test, a transformation of the 
data to (x+ 1) Y. was carried out before applying 
analysis of variance. This test sh'ongly supported the 
hypothesis that the means were the same. 
THE FEEDER CATTLE PRE-PURCHASE 
DECISION PROBLEM IN RELATION 
TO GAME THEORETIC CRITERIA 
The decision problem facing a fanner with respect 
to cattle feeding has two broad components: How 
large should the feeder operation be, and what 
types(s) of feeder program should he follow? For 
simplification these problems are considered as in-
dependent although this is not strictly true. For a 
given bundle of resources, the price relationships 
between the beef and other possible enterprises deter-
mine how large the feeder enterprise should be. The 
problem of what type( s) of feeder program to follow 
becomes a decision problem within the feeder enter-
prise. Under conditions of certainty, this dichotomy 
would be a false one. The feeder-cattle enterprise, 
however, is a risky one relative to other enterprises 
possible on Midwest farms. It is also an enterprise 
requiring specific managerial skills and a sizable 
fixed investment in cattle, housing, feedlots and equip-
momt. For these reasons the separation of the decision 
problem into the two parts is a justifiable analytic 
simplification in an exploratory study such as this. 
In our analysis we consider only the decision problem 
within the feeder enterprise in a given season. More-
over, the analysis is restricted to the planning situation 
of the farmer. No consideration is given to the specific 
market situation he faces when he actually enters a 
buying or selling market where decisions, made with 
a minimum of reflection, may be forced upon him. 
The farmer must decide on the feeding program fol-
lowed, the length of the fattening period or selling 
weight of the cattle and their quality when sold. 
Additional variables are th~ location of the buying 
and selling markets and the degree of personal entry 
into these markets. In selecting a feeder program, a 
decision has to be made as to which combination ( s) 
of these variables would be best to use. The questions 
the fanner must pose for himself are: What type of 
feeder-cattle program should I follow in the coming 
season? If I should have a number of programs, what 
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should their relative proportions be? These questions 
may be answered by default. Such would be the case 
for a farmer who followed some habitual feeder 
program. 
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
We now outline a model of the feeder-cattle decision 
problem. It is inherently a nonnative model but in-
corporates some descriptive elements. This decision 
problem must be related to a decision model. Hence, 
we outline here a general model of the farmer's deci-
sion theory or process to be considered in relation to 
his choice of cattle feeding programs. The transforma-
tion process of concern is for the feeder-cattle input, a 
generic input. It may take a variety of specific fonns in 
terms of cattle age, quality, breeding and previous 
management. The output is fat cattle and may take a 
variety of forms in terms of quality, weight and date 
of selling. 
THE ECONOMIC HIERARCHY 
The hierarchical groups relevant to the decision 
problem within the feeder enterprise may be specified 
as follows: 
N' the group of all fanners who may be ex-
pected to have a feeder-cattle enterprise. 
The order of N' is approximately 500,000.14 
N" the set of economic decision makers above 
N' in the economic hierarchy relevant to 
feeder cattle. This set is composed of three 
broad groups. In ascending order they are 
meat packers,l(; retailers and consumers. 
While there are relatively few meat pack-
ers, there are thousands of retailers and 
millions of consumers. 
N' " the set of economic decision makers below 
N' in the economic hierarchy relevant 
to feeder cattle. This set is essentially com-
posed of the ranchers who raise the feeder 
cattle. Its order is approximately 200,000. 
Regarding cattle as the generic input and output 
N', N" and N' " satisfy the chain arrangement under~ 
lying our model. For all practical purposes, these 
three sets are disjunct. 
NATURE'S ALTERNATIVES 
Consider first the possible role of the meat packers 
and of the meat retailing and consumer groups. As 
the final link in the chain, it is the consumers 
who detennine the demand for beef. Over a period 
of years, the most important factors influencing the 
aggregate demand schedule for beef are the number 
of consumers, their tastes and disposable incomes and 
the price of other meats. With respect to a given pro-
duction season, the consuming population with its 
tastes is relatively fixed. 
.. Exact figures nre not available. Th" figure given is based On" U S 
Census Bureau: 1954. Census of Agriculture. Vol. 2. 1956. .,. 
15 I,:, general, the meat packers act as wholesalers hy selling dire<:t to 
rehlIlers. 
Variations in the quantity of beef demanded, rele-
vant to the short run of a single production period, 
are primarily related to changes in the price of beef 
and other meats. The dominant cause of changes in 
the month-to-month price of beef, however, is the 
supply of beef. Most beef is consumed within 2 weeks 
of slaughter. Within a given year, the current supply 
of beef, relevant to current demand, is a given or 
predetermined variable. Moreover, competition among 
the meat packers in supply marketing services forces 
them to accept the quantity of fat stock offered for 
sale at any particular time. Because of its perishable 
nature, the wholesale and retail prices of beef must 
be adjusted to this supply if it is excessive. A rather 
similar situation prevails for other meats. 
In the short run, cattle supply is influenced little 
by the current action of packers, retailers or con-
sumers. It is a function of the decisions made by 
the thousands of livestock producers-decisions made 
not so much under the influence of current circum-
stances as under the influence of conditions some 
months in the past and of prior expectations of current 
conditions. Thus the primary influences causing 
within-year variations in fat-cattle prices emanate 
from the supply side. The role of the meat packers 
per se and, likewise, of the retailing and consuming 
groups is negligible. It is the farmers who "deal the 
cards." Given the deal, the packers, retailers and 
consumers have to play accordingly. Producers of 
other types of livestock, as well as those producing 
fat cattle, affect fat-cattle prices. Hence they influence 
the payoffs facing the farmer in his feeder-cattle 
decision problem. Nonetheless, in the short run, the 
major influence on fat-cattle prices comes from the 
supply of fat cattle. We consider the feeder cattle pre-
purchase decision problem as one faced from 4 to 14 
months prior to the time when the fat cattle will 
be sold. The farmer, therefore, has ample time to ad-
just his feeding program to the expected effects of 
the producers of other types of livestock. Such ad-
justments could involve any of the selling specifica-
tions: weight, quality and date of sale. Given human 
capabilities, this is a reasonable approach to the de-
cision problem at the pre-purchase stage. With a 
model specified in this fashicn, it is the aggregated 
choices of the other farmers considering a feeder-
cattle enterprise and of the feeder-cattle raisers that 
determine Nature's strategy. Recognition must also 
be given to weather at this point. It plays an important 
role through its effect on both grain and roughage 
production. 
The set S of possible states of Nature thus consists 
of all possible combinations over the ranges of the 
aggregative maneuvers which might be followed by 
the feeder raisers in aggregate, all the other beef 
feeders in total and the weather. Obviously, Nature's 
strategy selection will affect the individual decision 
maker, but not v:ce versa. 
Our model postulates that the decision maker 
effectively partitions this set S into subsets SJ, each 
subset being considered as a single broad alternative. 
The actual form of this partitioning will depend on 
the decision maker. The practical necessity for such 
a simplification of the problem is obvious; S is an 
infinite set since climatic effects may occur over some 
continuous range. 
THE DECISION MAKER'S ALTERNATIVES 
The set A of alternatives available to the cattle 
feeder is the set of all possible combinations of these 
variables, each taken over its range of possible values: 
sex, age, weight and quality of the cattle purchased, 
the feeding program followed, and the selling weight, 
quality and date of the fattened cattle. The set A is, 
therefore, of infinite order, some of the listed vari-
ables being continuous. Weight and age at purchase 
and weight and age at sale are such variables. Hence, 
the necessity for simplifying this set is apparent. A 
simplifying procedure leads to designation of a set 
of broad alternatives whose general element is desig-
nated by AI. This set of broad alternatives, perceived 
by the decision maker and including only those which 
he considers from the infinite array, will vary among 
individuals. It is expected to be a set of alternatives 
with practical significance, being finite and containing 
feeder programs in the form and with the the implicit 
range of variation usually found in common refer-
ence to the feeder enterprise. Some subset, which we 
designate A 0 , of this set of broad alternatives will 
be considered by the farmer in his planning for the 
forthcoming production period. This subset may be 
delimited by the farmer on the basis of habit. Mere 
rationally it might be based on some detailed longer-
run assessment of the situation in terms of trends 
in consumer demand, the risks involved and his 
personal goals and resource restrictions. 
THE PAYOFFS 
The model stipulates that the considered acts, Alo, 
will be appraised in relation to the broad alternatives, 
Sj available to Nature. This appraisal will be based 
upon the payoff element alj relevant to each act Alo 
and state of Nature Sj. For a rational analysis of the 
problem, these payoff elements must be comparable. 
This could be achieved in the present context by con-
sidering as payoffs the expected annual net percent 
return accruing to an investment in each of the con-
sidered acts. This return is determined by the expected. 
price of feeder cattle, the estimated cost of fattening 
the cattle and the expected price of fat cattle. Account 
must also be taken of the length of the feeding pro-
gram and of alternative investment of the feeder 
enterprise capital when it is not invested in feeder 
cattle. The method of combining variables to derive 
comparable payoffs is illustrated in Appendix B. 
Since cattle buying 2nd selling prices and fattening 
costs vary over the possible states of Nature, the 
payoffs will, in general, vary over the payoff matrix. 
They will also differ from one decision maker to an-
oth3r because of varying specifications of G1e alterna-
tives considered and of Nature's possible states, and 
because expectations will vary from one individual to 
another. By the implications of the general model 
constructed and shown to be capable of specification 
in terms of the feeder-cattle decision problem, the 
decision problem within the feeder-cattle enterprise 
is a problem under absolute uncertainty. 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE MODEL 
It remains now to assess the normative model, at-
tempting to see whether it has descriptive value. In 
other words, do farmers approach the decision prob-
lem within the feeder-cattle enterprise in some fashion 
akin to the model we have outlined? In making this 
appraisal, data are used from the 77 farmers described 
previously. 
DISCERNMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ACTS 
No attempt was made to ascertain the farmers' 
knowledge of the infinite set A of all possible feeder 
programs. It was obvious that all thought in terms of 
much broader alternatives than those that would 
constitute this set. Accordingly, the farmers' discern-
ment of alternative acts was first considered system-
atically at the level of the broad alternatives, Ai. These 
are the alternatives that constitute a partitioning of 
the set A. Theoretically, this partitioning might be 
approached in two ways: in terms of the over-all 
programs or by way of the attributes specifying each 
program. As would be expected, preliminary discus-
sion during the first-stage survey indicated that the 
program-by-program approach was impractical. The 
set of discerned alternatives is too large to be enumer-
ated verbatim. The approach through the decision 
variables-age, type of cattle, purchase weight, feed 
program and selling weight, date and quality-was 
therefore adopted. The problem consists of deter-
mining at what levels of the various decision variables 
does a farmer discern one program as being distinct 
from another? In what fashion are the decision vari-
ables stratified, if at all? 
In varying degrees, the farmers did stratify the 
decision variables; the typical groupings made for 
each decision factor are shown in table 3. Purchase 
weight, for example, was commonly grouped by 50-
pound intervals so that the average farmer distin-
guished five programs for steer calves with respect to 
the average purchase weight of the calves. While some 
farmers made finer distinctions and some broader 
ones, especially in relation to quality and feeder pro-
gram alternatives, the pattern of simplification is 
clear. No farmer's discernment of alternatives was 
so different from the general assessment shown in 
table 3 as to be worthy of comment. Moreover, no 
TABLE 3. FARMERS DISCERNMENT OF ALTERNATIVES WITmN 
THE FEEDER-CATTLE ENTERPRISE. 
Decision factor 
Age type ...... . 
Purchase weight 
Purchase quality 
Purchase date 
Fattening period 
F~ed pragram 
Selling quality 
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Commonly discerned a!temativcs 
within each decision factor 
steer calves, heifer calves, 
yearlings, 2 .. year-01ds 
by increments of 50 lbs. 
steer calves: 300-550 Ibs. 
heifer calves: 300-500 1bs. 
yearlings: 550-750 Ibs. 
2-year-alds: 800-1,000 Ibs. 
_ . .. medium, good, choice, fancy 
by months 
... . hy months 
steer calves: 8-14 months 
heifer calves: 7-12 manths 
yearlings: 6-11 manths 
2-year-alds: 3-7 manth. 
drylot 
pasture 
good, choice, high choice, prime 
Na. af 
alternatives 
within each 
decision 
factar 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
2 
1 
4 
farmer appeared to have difficulty in understanding 
the questions relevant to this discernment of alter-
natives. This is taken as evidence that the noted 
levels of stratification are indicative of the average 
farmer's train of thought. 
The pattern of simplification exhibited by the 
data of table 3 shows close correspondence to that 
typically used in newspaper and other farm-oriented 
reportings of the cattle market. Perhaps the farmers 
were merely reiterating these often-used distinctions, 
evidence that the set A is partitioned by farmers into 
some more practical and simpler set of alternatives 
as postulated by our model. Even with the level of 
stratification indicated in table 3, however, the set 
of all possible combinations among the decision fac-
tors is unmanageable. Indeed, from table 3 it should 
be possible to specify 22,560 alternative feeder-cattle 
programs that could be distinguished by the typical 
farmer interviewed. Obviously no farmer could con-
sider so many alternatives in planning his feeder 
enterprise. Although he could discern that they differ-
ed, it would be impossible for a farmer to evaluate 
so many possibilities. 
The evidence gathered indicates that this set of 
discernible alternatives is further reduced by two 
processes. First, a longer run decision appears to be 
made (sometimes by default) as to which of these 
alternatives will he considered over the shorter run 
of a year. Although no attempt was made to study 
this longer run decision, farmer comments indicated 
that it is greatly influenced by the farmer's risk feel-
ings, experience and resource limitations. Thus, quite 
a few farmers indicated that they never considered 
2-year-old feeder cattle because they were too risky. 
Others commented that they considered only calves 
because they were generally sure of "at least getting 
their money back from such an investment," The 
second method of reducing the number of alternatives 
to be considered consisted of a further broadening of 
the strata relevant to some of the decision variables. 
This applied especially to those factors relating to 
the selling specifications of the program. 
That these processes were carried out by farmers 
was evidenced by their responses to the question: 
In planning your feeder-cattle enterprise, what alter-
native feeder programs do you normally give con-
sideration to? These possible programs were specified 
in terms of the age type of feeders bought, their 
quality, weight and month ( s) of purchase, the feed 
program to be followed and the grade, weight and 
month cf sale. The essential feature of these responses 
is the number of alternative programs mentioned by 
each farmer and the level of stratification exhibited in 
these alternatives. Consider first the number of dis-
tinct alternatives mentioned by each respondent. Since 
these alternatives constitute the set A 0 of considered 
acts, their number is the order of A o. Table 4 gives, in 
frequency distribution form, the order of A 0 for each 
of the 77 farmers. 
While the information in table 3 indicates that all 
farmers realized that an extremely large number of 
alternatives exist, table 4 shows that only 4 percent 
considered more than five alternatives in the short 
run. For the 17 percent who had only a single pro-
TABLE 4. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF PRE-
PURCHASE ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BY FARMERS. 
Number of alternatives considered Number of farmers 
1 .................................... 13 
2 ................................... 33 
3 .................................... 14 
4 .................................... 8 
S .................................... 6 
6 .................................... 0 
7 .................................... 2 
8 .................................... 1 
Total ............ 77 
TABLE S. RANGES IN QUALITY, WEIGHT AND DATE OF BUYING 
AND SELLING CATTLE SPECIFIED IN CONSIDERED ALTERNA-
TIVES; PERCENT OF FARMERS CONSIDERING. 
Decision 
variable 
Specified range 
of decision 
variable 
Quality ............. single grade 
two grades 
Weight .............. zero 
SO lb •. 
100 lbs. 
ISO lb •. 
200 lb •. 
2S0 lbs. 
Date ................ 1 month 
2 months 
3 months 
4 months 
S months 
Percent of considered 
alternatives falling in 
each range 
Buying Selling 
80.S 82.9 
19.5 17.1 
73.6 3S.6 
9.8 7.8 
IS. 1 46.8 
O.S 4.4 
1;0 4.4 
0.0 1.0 
61.4 41.9 
21.S 30.2 
13.2 24.4 
2.4 3.5 
loS 0.0 
gram in mind, the short-run pre-purchase decision 
problem was trivial. Their selection was "habitual." 
The modal number of alternatives considered was 2, 
43 percent of the farmers considering only a pair of 
alternatives. Compared with the order of the average 
discerned parent set implicit in the data of table 3, 
it is obvious that the subsets A 0 classified in table 
4 are remarkably small. 
Table 5 shows the extent to which the quality, 
weight and date of buying and selling were broadened 
by the farmers in specifying their considered alterna-
tives. The feed-program variable is not referred to 
explicitly in the table. A range in the specification of 
weight, quality or date, however, implies a range 
in the feed program. 
Table 5 indicates that weight and date of buying 
and selling were most frequently broadened, especial-
ly in specifying the selling characteristics of a pro-
gram. Seemingly, farmers felt less sure about the sell-
ing environment than about the buying environment. 
Consequently, their considered alternatives in selling 
were more flexible than those of buying. Over-all, 205 
considered acts were nominated. The following figures 
show the percentage of these considered programs 
that contained a broadening of at least one, two or 
three of the buying and selling decision factors listed 
in table 3: 
No. of decision 
factors broadened 
Buying 
factor 
(percent) 
At least one ................ 57 
At least two ................. 23 
At least three ............... 3 
Selling 
factor 
(percent) 
80 
48 
9 
Of the 77 farmers, 70 specified a range of some 
decision variable in at least one of their considered 
alternatives. Fifty-six broadened at least one variable 
in each of their considered alternatives. There is, 
therefore, abundant evidence that the farmers simpli-
fied their decision problem, not only by abstracting 
some small number of discerned alternatives, but 
also by amalgamating a number of these alternatives 
in terms of the individual decision factors. 
To gain some indication of the reliability of the 
farmers' statements of the composition of the set A 0 
of considered acts, the alternatives mentioned were 
checked against a previous statement by each farmer 
of his plans for the current season. In only one case 
out of the 77 did the current plan include a program 
not specified in the subset of short-run alternatives. 
Further inquiry indicated that this plan entailed a 
prior commitment and was, in the current situation, a 
forced decision. 
Thus, in terms of the way in which the farmers 
discerned and reacted to the acts available to them, 
they did so in a manner completely in agreement 
with that postulated by our normative model. At least 
in this regard, the model has descriptive value. Simon's 
hypothesis has been strongly substantiated. Our real-
world decision makers did simplify a complex range 
of possible acts to a degree compatible with their 
capabilities. 
DISCERNl\IENT OF NATURE'S ALTERNATIVES 
What of the other aspect of our model, that of the 
states of Nature? In this regard, the first question to 
be considered is the extent to which the farmers con-
ceived of Nature's strategies as being determined by 
the aggregative actions of all other beef feeders, the 
feeder-raiser group and the weather. 
All of the 77 farmers recognized the weather as 
an important influence as suggested in table 6. This 
table shows the various ways in which the farmers 
conceived the pre-purchase situation in terms of other 
farmers as opponents in what might be called the 
"beef-feeder game." Each category of the table is 
TABLE 6. FARMERS' CONCEPTION OF THEIR OPPONENTS IN 
THE BEEF -FEEDING GAME. 
Conception of opponents in addition to No. of 
the w~ather farmers 
No conception. . . . . . . . . . .. . .............................. 6 
All other beef feeders individually .......................... 9 
All other heef feeders as a group .......................... 7'" 
Meat packers as a coalition . . .. . . . . .. ............... 4 
Meat packers as a coalition sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2. 
Meat packers as a coalition within markets .................... 3 
Feeder raisers as a group . . . .. ........... 2 
All other feeders individua!ly, feeder raisers as a group . . . . . .. 2 
All other feeders as a grou!" feeder raisers as a group '" . . . . .. 30' 
Meat packers as a coalition within markets, feeder 
raisers a§ a ~roup . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1. 
All other feeders individually, packers individually .... .. . . .. 3 
All other feeders ind;vidually, packers in coal;tion sometinle. .... 6 
All other feeder. individually, packers in coalition 
within markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 
All other feeders grouped, packers individually ............... 10 
All other feeders grouped, packer. grouped ... . ........... 3" 
All other feeders grouped, p:tckers grouped sometimes ......... 3 0 
All other feeders grouped, packers grouped within markets ........ 30 
All other feeders individllally, packers individually, feeder 
raisers grouped . . 2. 
All other feeders individually, packers in coalition, feeder 
raisers grouped .... ................................. 1 
All other feeders individually, packers in coalition sometime., 
feeder raiser. grouped . . . . . . . .. ....... 3 
All other feeders grouped, packers indiv:dually, 
f£eder raisers grouped . ... .. . ........... 20 
All other feeders grouped, packers in coalition, feeder 
raisers grouped . .. ... .. . . . .. . . ......... 4" 
All other feeders grouped, packers in coalition sometimes, 
feeder raisers grouped .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2 ° 
All other feeders grouped, packers in coalition within 
markets, feeder raisers grouped ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20 
Total ....... 77 
° Farmers who had a conception of the situation not very different 
from our specification of the theoretical model. 
913 
exclusive. Summarization indicates that 71 of the 
farmers had some conception of an opposition-59 
in a form involving some grouping and 12 in terms of 
individuals. The influence of other feeders in some 
fashion was recognized by 59 of the farmers; of meat 
packers by 48; and of the feeder raisers by 24 of the 
farmers. Not shown in table 6 is the fact that one 
farmer mentioned the consumer group as a segment 
of his opposition. Another specified all livestock pro-
ducers as an opponent. This farmer is included 
among the three who may be said to have visualized 
the situation exactly in terms of the theoretical models 
specified. That is, a combination of the weather, a 
feeder-raiser group and a group of all other beef 
feeders constitutes the basic determinants of Nature's 
possible states. With some degree of subjectivity, 
31 of the farmers had pictures of the situation ap-
proaching the normative model rather closely. These 
farmers are indicated by an asterisk in table 6. 
The data of table 6 were obtained during the 
second-stage survey by letting the farmers read ques-
tions and lists of possible persons or individuals who 
were, in effect, engaged in decisions which represent-
ed acts or "strategies against them." There is no 
m:ontion of feeder raisers, a purposeful omission de-
signed to provide a check on the farmers' responses. 
If a farmer did not mention feeder raisers, he was 
asked about them after he had answered the listed 
questions. Nineteen farmers mentioned feeder raisers 
on their own initiative. An additional five suggested 
their influence when questioned specifically on their 
role. 
To gain some idea of how operational these con-
c~pts of an opponent might be and to serve as an 
additional check on the original answers, the farmers 
were later asked an open-ended question as to which 
factors were most important in determining the type 
of feeder program they followed. As this was done in 
the third-stage survey, it is unlikely that answers were 
biased by memories of responses given to the relat~d 
questions of the second-stage survey. The data III 
table 7 show the frequency with which each of the 
listed factors was mentioned either as a primary or 
secondary determinant of choice. Fifty-four farmers 
mentioned only a single factor; 23 nominating two 
factors. It is noteworthy that no farmer mentioned 
any other specific farmer as influencing his choice. 
Nineteen of the farmers placed major emphasis on 
some aspect of their feed supply, the primary short-
run determinant of which is the weather. Some aspect 
of expected cattle prices, either buying or selling, 
TABLE 7. FACTORS NOMINATED BY FARMERS AS INFLUENC-
ING THEIR CHOICE OF PROGRAMS WITHIN THEIR FEEDER-
CATTLE ENTERPRISE. 
Factor influencing choice 
Number of times 
mentioned a~ 
Primary Secondary 
factor factor 
Expected peT>ional supply of grain and roughage .. 10 
Expected personal supply of grain .............. 1 
Expected personal supply of roughage .......... 8 
Expected buying price of feeder cattle ......... 14 
Expected buying and selling prices of cattle ...... 9 
E"1'ectcd selling price of fat cattle . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5 
Expected com price .......................... 0 
Feeder-cattle purchases of other farmers .......... 1 
Amount of risk involved ...................... 21 
Force of habit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8 
TOTAL .............................. 77 
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4 
o 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
6 
o 
23 
was given pIimary consideration by 28 of the farmers. 
One nominated the purchases made by other farmers 
''''ith feeder programs. These responses are quite com-
patible with our conception of Nature since the main 
determinant of cattle buying and selling prices is the 
aggregate actions of the feeder raisers and the other 
~rmers who buy feeders. 
There were eight farmers who suggested they 
selected their programs on some habitual basis. Refer-
ence to their considered alternatives indicated that 
two of these farmers considered only a single feeder 
program, while five considered two alternatives. A 
check of these stated alternatives against the history 
of their feeder enterprise over the prior 2 years and 
their current plans showed that six of them did in-
deed have a common selection over the 3 years. For 
the other two, a habitual selection did not appear 
to have taken place. It seems most likely that these 
eight farmers did not think in terms of an opponent, 
at least in the short run. 
Of the 21 respondents who mentioned risk as a 
major influence on their choice, seven considered 
only a single alternative, another seven, two alterna-
tives and the remaining seven at least three possible 
programs. Excluding those with a single alternative, 
four considered only calf programs, seven gave some 
consideration to yearlings, and three included 2-year-
old cattle as' one of their alternatives. 
Summarizing tllese results, we see that only 19 of 
the 77 farmers responded to the open-ended question 
on factors influencing their feeder choice by mention-
ing a primary determinant incompatible with the 
concept of Nature. These were the 8 mentioning habit 
or tradition and 11 of those mentioning risk. For the 
remaining 58, it seems that Nature probably did play 
some role, although perhaps not exactly as we have 
postulated. If account is taken of the secondary fac~ 
tors mentioned by some of the farmers, it would ap-
pear that only nine farmers did not place emphasis 
on some aspect of Nature. 
To what extent did the responses tabulated in table 
6 correspend to those shown in table 7? Main concern 
is with those farmers marked by an asterisk in table 6. 
They came closest to the conception of the situation 
postulated by the basic model of this study. Of these 
31 farmers, only 1 was not among the 58 who men-
tioned a primary choice influencing a factor compat-
ible with the model. 
Equivalently, included among the 46 farmers not 
marked by an asterisk in table 6 were 18 of the 19 
farmers who mentioned, as the primary influence on 
their feeder-pre gram choice, a factor apparently in-
compatible with the theoretical concept of Nature. 
Thus, there are 28 farmers whose responses to the 
open-ended question on choice were compatible with 
the model while their formalized answers, as tabulated 
in table 6, were not. The most reasonable explanation 
for this discrepancy is probably that these farmers 
did not answer the formal questions correctly in terms 
of their normal way of thinking about the problem. 
Certainly the majority of the farmers had not previous~ 
ly thought explicitly in terms of an opponent. This 
was indicated by many of the side comments on the 
formal questions. At the same time, it was obvious 
that many of the farmers thought and acted intuitive-
ly in terms of an opponent. In a sense, they were "at 
war" but did not wish to "make a declaration of war." 
Summarizing these comments on the data of tables 
6 and 7, it appears that at least 30, and perhaps as 
many as 58, of the 77 farmers had conceptions of an 
opponent in fair agreement with the model. A more 
definite statement would be desirable but, given the 
data, not warranted. 
DISCERNMENT OF STATES OF NATURE AND ASSOCIATED 
PAYOFFS 
In attempting to assess farmer use of the payoff 
and state of Nature concepts, an oblique method of 
questioning was pursued. For each respondent, a 
game against Nature was constructed. Each farmer's 
set of considered alternatives was taken as his avail-
able acts. Four broad states of Nature were delimited. 
These consisted of the four combinations possible from 
two types of weather-good and bad in terms of grain 
production-and two levels of aggregate activity on 
the part of other farmers with feeders-mainly short 
feeding or mainly long feeding. Prior informal ques-
tioning indicated that the inclusion of all the postu-
lated components of Nature would make the problem 
too complicated. Hence the feeder raisers were speci-
fied as behaving in an "average or normal fashion," 
a sufficiently meaningful concept to the farmers for 
construction of the game against Nature. Only two 
farmers questioned the meaning of the words "average 
or normal." 
For each of his available acts, the farmer was asked 
his expectation of cattle buying and selling prices 
under each of Nature's four possible states. Two of 
the farmers found this formulation of the decision 
problem incomprehensible. Both of them were among 
the six farmers who are listed in table 6 as having no 
formal conception of an opposition. The 75 farmers 
who did comprehend were asked whether they nor-
mally considered their pre-purchase alternatives in 
some such way with payoffs varying according to the 
conditions that might prevail. Twenty-four said that 
they did in some fashion or other. In each of these 
cases, however, further questioning indicated that the 
states of Nature involved in such considerations were 
very broad. Two of these farmers apparently con-
sidered four states of Nature, more or less in line 
with those postulated in the constructed game. One 
of these farmers considered two alternative acts, the 
other three. All of the other 22 farmers specified only 
two states of Nature. Nine of these pairs of states 
were based on the possible feed situation, 11 on the 
possible aggregative buying actions of other feeder 
fatteners, two on the possible cattle-feeding programs 
of all other farmers and one on consumer demand 
for meat. Nineteen of these 24 farmers were included 
among the 31 marked with an asterisk in table 6. All 
24 were among the 58 farmers who mentioned as a 
primary influence on their choice a factor compatible 
with the theoretical formulation of Nature. 
Fifty-three farmers apparently did not follow some 
specific conception of multiple states of Nature. It 
would seem that they made their deliberations in 
terms of a single state of Nature, perhaps with pay-
offs formulated as expected values. 
As a general assessment of the model, the farmers 
were asked whether they considered the constructed 
representation of the pre-purchase decision problem to 
be a good, fair or poor representation of the problem, 
. The responses were as follows: good-S8, fair-26 and 
poor-IS. 
This rating is a subjective one. Nonetheless, the 
figures indicate that the majority of the farmers con-
sidered the model reasonable in construction. Such a 
reaction is typical. As other writers have noted, once 
a normative mode of decision making has been point-
ed out to decision makers they will usually recognize 
it as such and often tend to consider the problem 
in such a manner in the future. It is interesting that 
all of the SI farmers whose stated formal conception 
of an opposition approached that postulated by the 
model were included among the 64 who thought the 
constructed model either good or fair. In fact, 26 of 
them said that it was good. Twelve of the IS who 
said that it was poor belonged to the group of 19 
farmers who nominated as a primary influence on their 
choice a factor apparently incompatible with the 
model's conception of Nature. 
THE EFFEGr OF OUTLOOK INFORMATION 
For a farmer considering feeder cattle as a possible 
enterprise, the crucial period for making plans and 
purchases is from July to DeCember. During these 
months, outlook forecasts of feeder and fat cattle 
market conditions during the coming season are avail-
able. These predictions, emanating from official 
sources, are discussed and analyzed in many of the 
communication media used by farmers. Alternatively, 
by attending sales the farmer may make his own 
appraisal of the trend of events in determining what 
we have called Nature's strategy. 
The fact that outlook information is available tends 
to overshadow the implication of our model that 
absolute uncertainty exists. If the information were 
pertinent and accurate and the forecasts made turned 
out to be correct, certainty would prevail. Such is 
not the case, however. One reason for this is a practi-
cal one. In principle, correct forecasts can be made, 
and it is not necessarily true that predictions always 
will be upset by reactions to the predictions. Allow-
ance for these reactions can be made only if a con-
tinuous function describing the reaction of those con-
cerned to a published prediction or forecast is avail-
able. Such a function is not available with respect 
to outlook forecasts relevant to the feeder and fat 
cattle markets. Evidence presented here shows that 
farmers do react to outlook forecasts. Th3refore, such 
forecasts, insofar as they are quantified rather than 
simply directional, can only be correct by coincidence. 
Moreover, even directional forecasts will be upset 
if reaction to the forecast is strong enough. 
There is little evidence available as to the reaction 
of Midwestern cattle feeders to outlook information 
and forecasts. Heer16 studied the directional accuracy 
,. HeeT, John F. Directional accuracy of fann price predictions in the 
Iowa fann outlook letter. Unpublished M. S. thesis. Iowa State Uni-
versity Library, Ames, Iowa. 1953. 
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of forecasts made in the Iowa Farm Outlook Letter, 
the primary source of the outlook information avail-
able to cattle feeders in Iowa. His 1953 study in-
dicated that 73 percent of the predictions made there-
in about the beef-cattle market were correct. However, 
utilizing Heer's data, it appears that of predictions 
made for cattle in the crucial pre-purchase period of 
the year from July to September inclusive, only 55 
percent were correct. For June to September inclusive, 
the figure was 62 percent. It is noteworthy that the 
greatest reaction to published forecasts probably 
Occurs during these months. Such reaction was prob-
ably a significant factor causing the percentage of 
successful predictions to decline during this planning 
and purchasing period. Moreover, it is likely that 
reactions to such forecasts have become stronger since 
1953, even to the extent that some farmers have be-
come so subtle as to react to a forecast in the opposite 
direction to what would be expected. That this is so 
was evidenced by data collected in this study. 
Before considering these data, an important feature 
of the published forecasts must be noted: The majority 
of forecasts are not pertinent in terms of the decision 
problem within the feeder-cattle enterprise. They do 
not, in general, consider a particular type of cattle 
versus another type. Not one out of the 65 predictions 
studied by Heer is couched in terms of specific types 
of cattle. Cattle are always referred to either as feeder 
cattle or fat cattle. Such information is of use mainly 
in deciding between the feeder-cattle enterprise and 
other enterprises, not for decisions within the feeder 
cattle enterprise. On the basis of the lack of specifica-
tion in the forecasts, it could be argued that available 
outlook information does not negate the implication 
of the model; namely, that absolute uncertainty pre-
vails in the situation studied. 
Concerning the descriptive value of the model, the 
important point is whether the farmers considered 
such information to be useful and whether they used 
it. To this end, the farmers were asked whether, prior 
to making their own deciSion, they actively sought 
information on the kinds of feeders other farmers 
had already bought or were interested in buying. 
Thirty-six farmers said they did, and 41 said they 
did not. These responses can be checked against the 
farmer's statement of his conception of the role of the 
other farmers with feeders as given in table 6. 
Those who did seek such information should tend to 
consider other farmers with feeders as a group. The 
extent to which this was so is shown in table B. 
Half of those who sought information considered 
other farmers with feeders as a group. Approximately 
one-third of those who did not seek information con-
sidered other farmers as a group "working against 
themselves." As would be hoped in terms of the model, 
the majority of the respondents who did not mention 
TABLE 8. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FARMERS' SEEKING 
OF INFORMATION AND THEIR CONCEPTION OF OTHER FARM-
ERS WITH FEEDERS. 
Conception of 
other fanners Number of fanners 
with feeders Seeking infonnatlon Not seeking inIonnation 
As a group """",""""'" 18 12 
As individuals """,""""'" 13 16 
Not mentioned "",.,.,.,"'"., 5 13 
Total ,,' , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , " , , " 36 41 
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other farmers with feeders as being important (line 3) 
were among the group who did not seek information. 
Outlook information was thought to be helpful in 
their pre-purchase planning by 29 of the farmers. 
Of the remainder, 21 thought it harmful, and 27 
thought it had no effect either way. All 29 of those 
who thought outlook information helpful were among 
the 36 who said that they actively sought such in-
formation. That 4B of the 77 farmers did not consider 
the information to be helpful is further evidence that 
outlook information does not eliminate uncertainty in 
pre-purchase decisions for the feeder enterprise.17 
CONSISTENCY WITH SPECIFIED MODEL 
The preceding analysis was aimed at assessing the 
descriptive value of the postulated normative model. 
Figure 1 summarizes the data by way of a tree dia-
gram. Three types of branches may be distinguished 
in terms of agreement with the over-all set of postu-
lates of the specific model. The farmers are stratified 
at five levels. The first relates to the hypothesis that 
the farmers simplify the decision problem by select-
ing for consideration some small number of acts from 
all those that are available. As the tree shows, all 
17 Two of the fannen who said that the outlook predictions were helpful 
commented that this was because they then knew it would be better 
to do the oppositel The 21 fanners who said outlook inIonnation was 
harmful were asked why they thought this was so. The reason given 
by 13 of them was that too many fanners followed the prediction, 
causing it to be wrong. Four said that the forecasts were based on 
inaccurate information. The remaining four based their opinion on 
historical grounds; they had followed a forecast that was unsuccessful. 
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Fig. 1. Tree diagram assessing the descriptive value of the postulated 
normative model. 
the farmers did carry out this simplification. The 
second level of stratification is based on the farmers' 
statements of their conception of an opposition. For 
31 of the farmers, this statement was in close agree-
ment with the model, although only three gave an-
swers in exact agreement with the model. The third 
level of stratification hinges on the farmers' responses 
to an open-ended question asking the primary factor 
influencing their choice among alternative feeder-
cattle programs. These responses were classified on 
the basis of whether or not the specified factor was 
compatible with the model. The fourth level of strati-
fication is based on the farmers' statements as to 
whether or not they considered their alternative acts 
in terms of payoffs varying according to the condi-
tions that might prevail. Those who said yes were, at 
least in this regard, acting in agreement with the 
model. The last stratification level is based on the 
farmer's assessment of outlook information taken on 
its face value, as being helpful or not helpful. Those 
who thought such information of no direct help were 
in agreement with the model. 
The tree shows that of the 77 farmers, 12 could be 
said fairly certainly to consider the decision problem 
in the fashion postulated by the model. For another 
three, the model was probably descriptively correct. 
Some of the remaining 62 farmers may have con-
sidered the problem in the manner postulated by the 
model, but it is unlikely. In its entirety, the model 
therefore has descriptive value for only a small pro-
portion of the population examined. 
Nonetheless, a large proportion of the farmers 
apparently did behave in partial agreement with the 
model. Thus, all 77 farmers considered a simplified 
set of alternative acts; 58 specified as the primary 
factor influencing their choice a factor compatible 
with the model; 24 made allowances for payoff varia-
tions over various possible states of Nature; and 50, 
insofar as they thought outlook information to be of 
no direct help, probably considered the decision 
problem as one involving a high degree of uncertainty. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORIES OF CHOICE 
A number of theories of choice (Wald, Laplace, 
etc.) applicable to decision making under absolute 
uncertainty were presented in an earlier section. The 
present section is devoted to an empirical appraisal 
of these several theories, based on the group of 77 
farmers used in our appraisal of the specific model. 
In assessing the role played by the theories, we at-
tempt to answer five questions. The answers given 
to these questions will not apply to all decision 
makers under absolute uncertainty.Is Strictly speaking, 
the answers relate only to the 77 individuals studied. 
Nevertheless, the data also will be analyzed statistical-
ly as if the 77 farmers were a random sample from an 
over-all population of owner-operators between 30 
and 50 years of age who had fed an average of at 
least 25 feeder cattle in each of the three feeding 
18 Ahsolute uncertainty prevails when the decision maker has no ob-
jective knowledge of the likelihood of occurrence of the possible out-
comes of the decision. He knows only what outcomes may occur. 
seasons prior to the survey. to The questions considered 
are: (1) To what extent do the theories have de-
scriptive value? In other words, do the farmers tend 
to make decisions under absolute uncertainty by 
analyses of the situation similar to those postulated by 
the theories? (2) How stable is the decision maker's 
approach to decision making as the setting of the 
decision problem varies? (3) So far as the theories 
are descriptively true, what characteristics of a de-
cision maker's background tend to be associated with 
the selection of a particular approach to the decision 
problem? (4) For those theories advanced as norm-
ative decision criteria, what value might they have 
in reducing ex ante resource misallocation? Equival-
ently, for the decision problems studied, do salient 
discrepancies exist between the farmers' solutions and 
the normative solutions? (5) Are there noteworthy 
differences between the various normative decision 
criteria in the degree to which they reduce ex ante 
resource misallocation in the situations studied? 
Answers to these questions, so far as they can be 
given, will be based on the farmers' solutions to a 
number of decision problems under absolute un-
certainty. These problems were of two types, some 
being completely hypothetical and some representing 
a practical problem within the feeder-cattle enter-
prise. To simplify the presentation, we first will 
consider these two sets of problems separately, draw-
ing the analyses together later. We begin by consider-
ing the hypothetical decision problems. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL DECISION 
PROBLEMS 
These problems were based on the payoff matrix 
used to illustrate the several decision theories ex-
plained earlier. For convenience, this matrix is repro-
duced here. 
Decision maker's States of Nature 
alternatives S, S, S3 S. 
Al 2,500 3,500 0 1,500 
A, 1,500 2,000 500 1,000 
A3 0 6,000 0 0 
A. 1,500 4,500 0 0 
In posing the hypothetical problems to the farmers, 
the alternative acts A1 , A~, A3 and A4 were described 
simply as four possible annual investments, each 
requiring the same amount of capital. The payoffs 
shown opposite each act were specified as the possible 
dollar net returns that might accme over the invest-
ment year if that act were chosen. It was pointed out 
that for a given investment choice, the likelihood 
of receiving any particular payoff relevant to that 
choice was completely unknown; the decision maker 
could only be sure that he would receive one of the 
payoffs listed opposite whichever act he selected. 
This basic problem was posed in four "once only" 
contexts. Two of these specified that the alternative 
selected was to be the only income source; the other 
,. F tcsts based on analysis of variance and Chi.square tests will be 
the principal statistical procedures used. In using analysis of variance 
to make tests of significance, it will be assumed that the data fuUilI 
the necessary assumptions, viz. that the various fixed effects and the 
error arC additive and that the errors are noncorrclated and nonnally 
distrihuted. 
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two that a sure annual income of $3,000 additional to 
that derived from the selected act was also available. 
For each of these income situations the farmer was 
asked which act he would choose when the selected 
investment (a) could only be made once and (b) 
had to be made in each of 20 consecutive years. It 
was stipulated that Nature's strategy might vary from 
year to year over these 20 years. 
The farmers were asked to treat each problem as 
if it were a real-life decision that had to be made 
under their current circumstances. No attempt was 
made to specify the available acts as real-world 
alternatives. The net income figures used are realistic, 
however, compared with those commonly found 
throughout the survey area. For each solution no,min-
ated, the reason for that specific choice also was 
requested. 
All the farmers were owner-operators with con-
siderable resources at their disposal. Also, none of the 
alternative acts could lead to absolute losses. It is 
therefore reasonable to regard the I-year setting of 
the problem as having only short-run effects and the 
20-year setting being considered as having long-run 
repercussions on the decision maker. Thus, the four 
decision problems can be characterized as follows: 
(a) short-run with no sure income; (b) short-run with 
sure income; (c) long-run with no sure income; (d) 
long-run with sure income. 
DESCRIPTIVE ROLE OF THE THEORIES OF CHOICE: 
HYPOTHETICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
The frequencies with which each of the alternatives 
were chosen in each setting of the problem by the 
77 farmers are listed in table 9. For convenience, the 
theories of choice compatible with the selection of 
each alternative are also noted in the table. Acts Al 
and A2 were most frequently selected. With no sure 
income available, the majority of farmers chose A2 • 
With an additional sure income, the majority chose 
AJ • Only when an additional sure income was avail-
able did a significant proportion of the respondents 
choose Aa or At. 
Had the farmers made their selections in a random 
manner, in reference to each column, a distribution 
pattern with approximately 20 selecting each act 
would be expected. In no case do the listed distribu-
tions approach such a pattern. Moreover, as table 9 
shows, there are quite distinct differences between the 
frequency patterns for each setting or column of the 
TABLE 9. DECISION THEORIES COMPATIBLE WITH THE 
SELECTION OF EACH ALTERNATIVE AND THE NUMBER OF 
FARMERS SELECTING EACH ALTERNATIVE IN EACH HYPO-
THETICAL DECISION PROBLEM. 
Alter-
native 
se!ected 
Compatible decision Setting of decision problem 
theories' Additional 
No Sure income sure income 
Short Long Short Long 
nm nm run run 
Al , .. Laplace; 22 32 41 44 
A. .. , . . . . Wald; Hurwicz;b 
Simon;' Shackle; 52 41 16 13 
A. . ...... Hurwicz;d Shackle; 2 2 13 6 
A •........ Savage; 1 2 7 14 
Total ...... 77 77 77 77 
• Simon's theory with a zero aspiration level is compatible with each 
alternative. 
b With {J ;;;. 8/9 . 
• With an aspiration level greater than zero. 
• With {J ~ 8/9. 
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decision problem. Ipso facto, it is concluded that the 
farmers made their choices in an active way, and that 
credence may be given to their explanations of these 
choices. Assuming the 77 farmers to be a random 
sample, Chi-square tests strongly support the hypo-
thesis that the farmers' selections were purposive. 
A Chi-square test for independence between the 
setting of the decision problem and the alternatives 
chosen, regarding the data matrix of table 9 as a 
contingency table, also led to rejection of the hypo-
thesis that the choices made were independent of the 
problem setting. 
DECISION PROCEDURES FOLLOWED 
In all cases in which Ai was chosen, the respondents 
gave as their reason that it had the highest average 
payoff or that its row total was the largest. Selection 
of Al, therefore, always was based on the Laplace 
criterion. As was quite evident during the collection 
of the data, it was not based on the use of Simon's 
theory with a zero aspiration level. Selection of Al 
was always preceded by some numerical calculations 
on the part of the respondent, either of row totals or 
averages. Numerical calculations by the respondent 
never led to any choice other than AI. 
All farmers selecting A2 indicated that they did so 
because it guaranteed a minimum return of $500 
under all possible states of Nature. Their reasoning is 
in agreement with the Wald criterion, the Hurwicz 
criterion with a zero degree of optimism, Simon's 
theory and the special case of Shackle's theory when 
it is equivalent to the Wald criterion. (We have al-
ready noted that the Hurwicz criterion with a zero 
level of optimism is equivalent to the Wald criterion.) 
Given the respondents' reasoning, it seems most 
probable that the selection of A2 was generally based 
on a Wald maximin approach or the use of Simon's 
theory with a nonzero aspiration level, rather than 
on the special cases of the Shackle and Hurwicz 
theories. Moreover, in situations where the decision 
maker's aspiration level exceeds or equals the maxi-
mum minimum payoff, Simon's theory is equivalent to 
the Wald criterion. Thus, there is only a small chance 
of error in attributing the selection of A2 to a Wald 
criterion type of approach. It was the approach most 
implicit in the farmers' reasons. 
Farmers' explanations for the selection of Aa em-
phaSized a preference for gambling. They recognized 
the "riskiness" of Aa relative to the other alternatives 
but were attracted by the possibility of receiving the 
maximum possible payoff of $6,000-behavior incon-
sistent with the Simon theory as a basis for selection 
of Aa. A gambling motivation is, however, compatible 
with a Shackle or a Hurwicz approach. 
A gambling motivation was generally given for the 
choice of A4; many of the farmers suggesting that 
this investment alternative was chosen as a com-
promise between the relative "safeness" of Al or A2 
and the "riskiness" of Aa. Such reasoning is suggestive 
of the Savage regret approach, although no farmer 
came close to giving an explicit statement of this 
criterion as the basis for his selection of A4• Over-all, it 
appears that only the Laplace and the Wald criteria 
have widespread descriptive value in explaining the 
farmers' choice. In choosing All a large proportion 
of the respondents made a choice incompatible with 
Shackle's hypothesis. 
STABll..ITY OF CHOICE 
Inspection of table 9 shows that many changes in 
choice occurred as the setting of the hypothetical 
decision problem varied, otherwise each alternative 
would have been selected the same number of times 
in each of the four settings of the decision problem. 
Only a third of the farmers did not alter their choice 
as the problem's context varied. One farmer always 
chose A4 , one always A3, 11 always A2 and 13 always 
AI. It is certain that the shifts in choice that occurred 
are a function of the particular payoffs and problem 
settings specified in the hypothetical problems. In 
consequence, the changes in choice will not be dis-
cussed in full detail. Only the general implications 
of the data will be considered. The most important 
fact is that two-thirds of the respondents varied their 
decision-making approach as the context of the de-
cision problem altered. Of these changes, the majority 
related to the income setting of the problem and not 
the length of time over which the decision would be 
influential. This is revealed somewhat by the data of 
table 9 and more clearly by the data of tables 10 
and 11. 
Table 10 relates to the time setting of the hypo-
thetical decision problem. In it, no account is taken 
of the income setting of the decision problem. The 
table entries were derived by adding the correspond-
ing frequencies for each choice pair AIAj (i = 1, 2, 
3, 4; j = 1, 2, 3, 4) in the two "no sure income" settings 
of the problem and in the two "additional sure in-
come" settings of the problem, Ai and Aj referring 
to the choices made by each respondent in the short-
run and long-run contexts of the problem, respective-
ly. Since each farmer was asked to make two short-run 
and two long-run decisions, each respondent is re-
corded twice in table 10. Equivalently, the table re-
lates to twice 77, or 154, choice pairs. Entries on the 
main diagonal of the table's "AIAj matrix" indicate the 
number of times out of 154 that the choice pair AIAj 
( i=j) occurred. Such pairs constitute 80 percent of 
the total number of choice pairs. In other words, 80 
percent of the solutions given by the farmers relevant 
to the time setting of the problem show no change 
in choice (or change in the decision-making ap-
proach) as the time setting of the problem varied. 
Assuming the survey farmers to be a random sample, 
the 95-percent confidence interval for the percentage 
TABLE 10. FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF PAIRS OF 
CHOICES AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES A" A., A. AND A. 
RELATIVE TO THE TIME SETTINGS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL 
DECISION PROBLEMS, AND FREQUENCY WITH WHICH EACH 
ALTERNATIVE WAS SELECTED IN EACH TIME SETTING. 
Choice in 
short-run 
setting 
Choice in long-run setting Total 
Al A. A. A. frequency 
(No.) 
Al .............. 57 
A ............... 17 
A ............... 2 
A. . ............ 0 
Total frequency . . .. 76 
(No.) 
3 
51 
o 
o 
54 
(No.) 
1 
o 
7 
o 
8 
(No.) 
2 
o 
6 
8 
16 
(No.) 
63 
68 
15 
8 
154 
of choice pairs of the type AIAj (i=j) is from 71 to 
87 percent. 20 
The frequencies of choice pairs of the type AIAj 
( i¥oj) are shown by the entires off the main diagonal 
of the "AIAJ matrix" of table 10. Each such pair repre-
sents a shift in choice by a respondent between the 
short-run and long-run setting of the problem. Thirty-
one such shifts in choice occurred. Of these, 17 were 
away from A2 into Al as the time influence of the 
decision became greater. Remembering that the rea-
sons for selecting A2 generally suggested use of the 
Wald criterion, while those for A1 corresponded to 
the Laplace criterion, it appears' that the majority 
of the shifts in choice occasioned by the extension of 
the decision's time influence related to a change from 
a Wald to a Laplace approach. The converse change, 
indicated by the pair A1A2, occurred three times. 
The choice pair A3~ occurred six times, indicating 
in these cases a change from' a conservative to a less 
conservative approach as the time influence of the 
decision lengthened. Over-all, despite some conflict-
ing tendencies, the data indicate that the farmers 
were least conservative in their long-run decisions, 
remembering, however, that the majority of the choice 
pairs indicate no change in the respondents' decision-
making approach as the time setting of the problem 
varied. 
Except that it relates to the income context of the 
hypothetical decision problems and takes no account 
of their time setting, table 11 is similar in construction 
to table 10. Mechanically, it may be read in the same 
fashion as table 10 and indicates that only 68 out of 
154, or 44 percent, of the solutions given by the farm-
ers relevant to the income setting of the problem 
showed no change in choice (or change in the de-
cision-making approach) as the income setting of the 
decision problem varied. 
Again assuming the survey panel to be a random 
sample, the 95-percent confidence interval for this 
estimate of 44 percent is from 34 to 54 percent. The 
figure of 44 percent contrasts markedly with the 
corresponding figure of 80 percent relative to the time 
setting of the problem. Obviously, within the range 
of time and income settings specified, the respondent's 
decision-making approach was generally far more re-
sponsive to variations in the income setting of the 
problem than to variations in the time setting. In-
spection of table 11 reveals that altogether there were 
86 shifts in choice between the two income contexts 
of the problem; 53 of these changes were away from 
.0 Based on the assumption that the number of such choice pairs follows 
a binomial distribution. 
TABLE 11. FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF PAIRS OF 
CHOICES AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES A" A., A. AND A. RELA-
TIVE TO THE INCOME SETTINGS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL DE-
CISION PROBLEMS, AND FREQUENCY WITH WHICH EACH 
ALTERNATIVE WAS SELECTED IN EACH INCOME SETTING. . 
Choice in additional sure 
income setting Total. Choice in no 
sure income 
setting 
A. A. A. A. frequency 
(No.) 
Ai .............. 32 
A •.............. 53 
A •.............. 0 
A. . ........... 0 
Total frequency ..... 85 
(No.) 
o 
29 
o 
o 
29 
(No.) 
10 
5 
4 
o 
19 
(No.) 
12 
6 
o 
3 
21 
(No.) 
54 
93 
4 
3 
154 
919 
A~ into AI, implying a shift from a Wald to a Laplace 
approach, as the income uncertainty associated with 
the decision decreased. Indeed, the off-diagonal en-
tries of table 11 show that every change in choice 
was either away from A2 into AI, Aa or A4, or from 
Al into A3 or A4 as income uncertainty decreased. 
Since the reasons given for selection of Aa or A4 in-
variably involved a gambling motivation, it is appar-
ent that every shift in choice denoted the adoption of 
a less conservative decision-making approach as the 
income uncertainty inherent in the problem's context 
declined. Moreover, comparison of the choice fre-
quencies given in table 9 for similar time settings of 
the problem reveals that a majority of the respondents 
changed their decision-making approach as the in-
come setting of the problem varied. This is in contrast 
to the situation relative to variations in the time 
influence context of the problem. As table 9 also 
shows, only a minority of the respondents altered their 
approach to the problem as its time influence varied. 
Comparing the solutions for the long-run and short-
run problems with no sure income available, as listed 
in table 9, little difference in popularity between A3 
and A4 is evident. Indeed, neither of these acts were 
very popular; apparently, with no additional sure 
income available, only a few of the farmers were 
prepared to gamble. With an additional sure income 
of $3,000 available, however, both A3 and A4 became 
far more popular. Also, inspection of table 9 shows 
that a distinct difference in popularity between As 
and A4 developed as the period of influence of the 
decision varied. In the short-run setting A3 was by far 
the more popular of the two; in the long-run context, 
the position was reversed.2I Since Ai is intuitively a 
safer investment than A3 , it appears that most of those 
farmers who "gambled" in the sure income setting 
preferred to take greater risks in their short-run de-
cisions than in their long-run decisions. This contrasts 
with the behavior of those who switched from a Wald 
type of approach to the Laplace algorithm as the time 
influence of the decision became greater. The latter 
tended to take greater risks in their long-run decisions. 
Numerically, the former group was more important. 
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN PA'ITERNS OF CHOICE AND 
SELECTED CHARACfERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS 
The respondents were asked to solve the hypo-
21 Assuming the population to be a random sample, the (adjusted) 
Chi-square test value for this difference in popularity is 3.6. This 
value is significant at the 6-pereent level. 
thetical decision problems in terms of their current 
circumstances. Assuming that they did, we now con-
sider these solutions against the respondents' back-
grounds attempting to perceive what associations exist 
between the patterns of choice over the four problems 
posed and some basic athibutes of the respondents. In 
doing this, we will exclude the two respondents who 
operated extremely large farms relative to the other 
75 members of the population. 
Table 12 lists the means of some characteristics 
of those farmers following each pattern of choice 
shown at the top of the table. Four choice patterns 
are delimited; intuitively, they are the most meaning-
ful of all those that might have been listed. For both 
Al and A2 there was a noteworthy number of farmers 
who chose this single act in each of the four settings 
of the hypothetical decision problem. These farmers 
are grouped separately in the table under the headings 
of "Always At" and "Always A2." The 13 farmers who 
always selected Al used the Laplace criterion con-
sistently. It is most likely that the 11 who always 
chose A2 were following an approach of the Wald 
type. The remaining farmers are classified into two 
groups: those who changed their choice as the setting 
of the problem varied but always selected either Al 
or A2 and those who selected either A3 or A4 at least 
once as a solution for one of the four problems posed. 
As and A4 are grouped together because, intuitively, 
they are the least safe of the alternative acts. Their 
selection, given the availability of Al or A2 , implies 
a tendency to gamble, or at least to take risks. Con-
versely, Al and A2 are, relative to A3 and A4 , con-
servative alternatives. In table 12, these four decision 
patterns are listed from left to right in their intuitive 
order of decreasing conservativeness. 
Age. Those farmers who always selected A2 tended 
to be the older members of the population. It seems 
reasonable that these older respondents should use a 
Wald type of approach. They probably place more 
emphasis on maintaining their current situation as a 
base for their retirement rather than on bettering 
their current status. The younger members of the 
group generally chose either Al or A2 , switching be-
tween the Laplace and Wald approaches as the con-
text of the decision problem varied. 
Education. On the average, those respondents who 
chose A2 had the smallest number of years of formal 
education. To some extent, this may be correlated with 
the fact that these farmers tended to be the older 
ones; their opportunities to obtain education may not 
TABLE 12. AVERAGE OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE FARMERS WITHIN EACH DECISION PATTERN GROUP.-
Decision pattern oVer the four hypothetical decision problems 
Characteristic Unit Always Either Always Sometimes 
A. A1 or A. A1 A3 or A_ 
(11 farmers) (72 fanners) (13 farmers) (29 farmers) 
Age .................... year 45.2 40.2 42.4 42.1 
Formal education ........... year 10.9 11.1 12.0 11.8 
Dependents ............... number 2.8 3.6 3.4 3.9 
Total capital invested ....... $1,000 91.0 121.2 127.5 96.8 
Net worth ............... $1,000 84.6 107.2 104.6 82.3 
Equity ................... percent 93.0 88.4 82.0 85.0 
Feeder cattle purchased" .... number 77.7 115.6 121.9 115.5 
Calves .............. percent· 62.2 44.7 59.6 39.1 
Yearlings ............. percent· 37.8 54.8 34.4 49.6 
2-year-olds ........... percent· 0.0 0.5 6.0 11.3 
• The two fanners with extremely large farms are excluded. 
b Cattle purchased during the period July I, 1956, to June 30, 1957. 
c Percentage of number of feeder cattle purchased. 
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Over-all 
average 
(75 farmers) 
42.1 
11.5 
3.6 
108.5 
93.9 
86.5 
111.1 
47.1 
47.1 
5.8 
have been as great as those available to younger 
members of the population. Those who used the La-
place criterion, choosing Al , had the most education. 
Dependents. Perhaps unexpectedly, those who al-
ways chose A2 had the smallest number of dependents, 
perhaps because they were, in majority, the older ones 
whose children were no longer classed as dependents. 
We would have expected conservative choices to be 
associated with a larger number of dependents, espe-
cially since business and family interests are closely 
associated in farming. Those respondents with a larg-
er-than-average number of dependents, however, 
tended to choose the more risky, but possibly more 
remunerative, alternatives, As and A4, at least once. 
Total capital invested. Quite large differences exist-
ed among the four groups in terms of their capital 
investment. Above average investment tended to be 
associated with consistent selection of A1 or of either 
A1 or A2. On the other hand, those choosing A2 had 
the smallest capital investment. Small capital invest-
ment, relative to the average investment of the over-
all group, was also associated with selection of As 
or A4 • 
Net worth. Those farmers with a smaller-than-aver-
age net worth tended to follow either the least con-
servative choice pattern, sometimes selecting As or A4, 
or else the most conservative pattern, always choosing 
A2. Such contrasting decisions suggest that the de-
cision maker's inherent psychological make-up may 
be the dominant influence affecting his choice. 
Equity. The lower an entrepreneur's equity ratio, 
the greater the risk he is taking, ceteris paribus. To a 
degree, therefore, an entrepreneur's equity ratio is an 
indication of his willingness to take risks. This is 
borne out by the equity data of table 12. Those re-
spondents with a higher-than-average percentage 
equity either always chose A2 or chose either Al or 
A2 • As previously mentioned, these are the two most 
conservative choice patterns among the four patterns 
delimited. Indeed, those choosing A2, which corre-
sponds to a Wald type of approach to the decision 
problem, had a very high percentage equity on the 
average. Conversely, those who used the Laplace 
approach or tended to gamble by sometimes choosing 
either A3 or At had relatively low equity ratios. 
Feeder cattle purchased. Compared with other 
enterprises possible on Midwest farms, the feeder-
cattle enterprise is "risky." Hence, to some extent, 
the size of a farmer's feeder enterprise is an indica-
tion of his tendency to take risks. The total number 
of cattle, or any other unweighted aggregate index, 
however, is only a rough indication of the risk taken. 
Such measures do not take into account the differ-
ences in risk between the various age types of cattle-
differences that are quite substantial. Least risky are 
calves, while 2-year-olds are extremely risky. Yearlings 
have an intermediate level of associated risk. Against 
this background, we now consider the cattle data 
listed in table 12. 
As expected, those farmers who used a vVald type 
of approach, always choosing A2 , tended to have 
smaller feeder-cattle enterprises. Moreover, their feed-
er operation contained the greatest proportion of 
calves of any of the groups listed and the smallest 
proportion of 2-year-olds. Conversely, those who tend-
ed to gamble by sometimes selecting A3 or A4 had 
the largest proportion of 2-year-olds and the smallest 
proportion of calves. Since 2-year-olds are the most 
risky type of cattle to fatten, it is not surprising that 
the proportion of 2-year-olds increases across the 
table as the conservatism of the decision pattern de-
creases. 
From an economic viewpoint, a more interesting 
measure of the relative importance of the decision 
pattern groups is their role in terms of production. 
A satisfactory index is the relative weight of feeder 
beef purchased and fat beef sold by each group. 
Such figures are listed in table 13 for the 1956-57 
season. It is noteworthy that those who changed their 
decision-making approach, as the setting of the hypo-
thetical decision problem varied, handled nearly three-
quarters of all the beef fed. 
TABLE 13. PERCENTAGE OF FEEDER BEEF BOUGHT AND OF 
FAT BEEF SOLD. IN 1956-57 BY THE SURVEY PANEL, HANDLED 
BY EACH DECISION PATTERN GROUP. 
Decision pattern Percentage of all Percentage of all 
group feeder beef feeder beef 
~ __ ~ ____________ bo~ug~h~t _____________ so~ld.~ ____ __ 
Always A. .... 9.3 10.0 
Eitber Al or A. :30.1 30.4 
Always Al . . .. . 17.9 18.8 
Sometimes A. or A. 42.7 40.8 
NORMATIVE ROLE OF THE THEORIES OF CHOICE: 
HYPOTHETICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
No normative implications -of "real-world" decisions 
can be drawn from analysis of the farmers' solutions 
of the hypothetical problems analyzed. Hence, we 
now turn to a consideration of more practical or "real-
world" problems and farmers' reactions to them. These 
problems were conshucted from data supplied by the 
farmers. They relate to pre-purchase planning within 
the feeder-cattle enterprise. Each farmer's set of con-
sidered feeder programs was taken as his alternative 
acts. For each of these possible programs, the farmer 
was asked to give his expectation of the most probable 
buying and selling price of cattle under four possible 
states of Nature. Two farmers could not do this. 
Formulation of the decision problem in such terms 
was beyond them. Consequently, the major part of 
the analysis of the practical problems refers to 75 
respondents. The specified states of Nature were the 
four combinations possible between two mutually 
exclusive weather possibilities and two mutually ex-
clusive aggregate fattening policies on the part of all 
other farmers with a feeder-cattle enterprise. The 
feeder-raiser group was specified as behaving in 
"average or normal fashion," the reason for this simpli-
fication being that discussed previously. 
Weather was specified in terms of the magnitude 
of the national corn crop. The two alternatives were 
a large national corn crop, leading to an average corn 
price of $1.10 per bushel through the fattening season, 
or a small corn crop, giving rise to an average price 
of $1.30 per bushel. By using this mode of expression, 
the possible effects of the weather were defined in a 
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manner meaningful to the farmers. The alternatives 
open to all other cattle feeders were taken as their 
planning to produce mainly short-fed cattle to be 
sold from March to June or mainly long-fed cattle to 
be sold from June to September. The four combina-
tiens among these alternatives will be designated as 
follows: Sl, good cropping weather and marketings 
mainly March to June; S2, good cropping weather and 
marketings mainly June to September; Sa, poor crop-
ping weather and marketings mainly March to June; 
Sol, poor cropping weather and marketings mainly 
June to September. 
Each farmer specified his price expectations for each 
state of Nature. He then was asked which alternative 
feeding program he would select and the number of 
cattle to be fed under each program. From these data, 
the proportion of the farmer's feeder enterprise re-
sources that would be devoted to each alternative 
was calculated. As in the real-world situation, the 
respondent was allowed to select the null alternative 
of having no feeder cattle if he desired. The problem 
was posed under the following three possible circum-
stances: either good or poor weather possible; good 
weather certain; poor weather assured. For each of 
these problems it was specified that absolute un-
certainty prevailed over Nature's possible states. 
Normative payoff matrices were constructed from 
the price expectation and cattle feeding data supplied 
by the respondents.22 In these matrices, the payoff 
elements were expressed as the expected percentage 
net return on each act, allowance being made for the 
length of the investment. Constant returns to scale 
were presumed to prevail in each alternative. Solu-
tions to the practical decision problems were obtained 
by applying the theoretical procedures illustrated in 
the section explaining the several theories of choice 
under absolute uncertainty. 
DESORIPTIVE ROLE OF THE THEORIES OF CHOICE: 
PRAcrICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
We now examine the farmers' solutions of these 
practical decision problems in relation to the questions 
posed at the outset of this section. We first consider 
the descriptive role of the theories of choice. We can 
consider the descriptive role of only the Laplace 
equiprobability, Wald maximin and Savage regret 
theories of decision making under absolute uncertain-
ty. The theories of Hurwicz, Simon and Shackle can-
not be appraised because the respondents' pessimism-
optimism indices, aspiration levels and gambling in-
difference maps are unknown. The Wald maximin and 
Savage regret criteria will not be considered with only 
pure strategies permitted; mixed strategies are feasible 
in the practical problems, and it would be irrational to 
consider these procedures only in terms of pure 
strategies. The main procedure in analyzing the de-
scriptive role of the decision theories is as follows: 
First, the empirical solutions to the decision theories 
will be constructed as normative specifications. Next, 
the actual choices made by farmers as descriptive 
actions will be compared with the empirical solutions. 
•• The construction of the payoff matrices is explained in Appendix B. 
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The theoretical solutions of the practical problems 
can be divided into two main classes: If the payoff 
martix contains a dominant row, all three of the 
Laplace, Wald and Savage theories select as optimal 
the act corresponding to that row; all three answers 
to the problem are then identical. Such occurrences 
constitute the first grouping of the theoretical solu-
tions. If the payoff matrix does not contain a dominant 
row, the theories will not suggest identical solutions. 
Such occurences constitute the second class of solu-
tions. The relative importance of these two groupings 
of the solutions is shown in table 14 for each problem 
setting. 
TABLE 14. CLASSIFICATION OF THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO 
THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS. 
Problem setting Number of problems in which the Laplace, 
Wald and Savage solutions were: 
Identical Not identical 
Good weather certain ......... 60- 15 
Poor weather certain .......... 66 9 
Either good Or poor 
weather 52- 23 
• Including one problem whose solutions, for all practical purposes, 
were identical. 
Thus, of the 225 problems constructed, 178 con-
tained a dominant alternative which was automatically 
selected by each of the theoretical decision pro-
cedures. That so many dominant acts existed is partly 
because of the small number of alternatives present 
in each problem. It also reflects the feelings of those 
respondents who did not attach strong differential 
effects to some or all of Nature's possible states. 
Assuming the survey panel to be a random sample, 
a Chi-square contingency test value of 8.0 for the data 
of table 14 indicates that there is less than one 
chance out of 100 that the occurrence of idential solu-
tions is not independent of the setting of the practical 
decision problems. Moreover, as the following discus-
sion outlines, a reasonable explanation can be given 
for the pattern of the data in terms of our theoretical 
model. 
Dominant alternatives tended to occur most fre-
quently when poor weather was specified as certain. 
This is possibly a reflection of the fact that with poor 
weather assured, fewer cattle would be fed and fewer 
farmers would feed cattle. Under such circumstances 
there would be fewer aggregative maneuvers possible 
by those other farmers feeding cattle, a phenomenon 
most likely leading to a smaller range of possible varia-
tion in fat cattle prices and, concomitantly, a greater 
chance that a dominant alternative might exist. Con-
versely, with either good or poor weather possible, it 
might be expected that there would be least chance 
of a dominant alternative occurring. As the preceding 
figures show, dominant alternatives were least fre-
quent when the weather was not specified. 
We will first examine the farmers' solutions for thase 
problems containing a dominant alternative. 
ALL THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS IDENTICAL 
Table 15 gives a qualitative classification of the 
farmers' solutions for those 178 problems with a 
dominant alternative. The classification is in terms 
of the agreement between the farmer and theoretical 
TABLE 15. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FARMER AND THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS IN 
THOSE CASES WHERE ALL THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS WERE IDENTICAL. 
Number 
of a1ter- Number of cases in which Number of cases in Number of cases in Total number of cases 
natives the farmer and the which the farmer'S solution which the fanner and in which all theoretical 
consid- theoretical solutions were overlapped the theeretical theoretical solutions solutions were identical 
ered Identical solution were disjunct 
Ga pb E< G P E G P E G P E 
1 ............... 12 13 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 13 13 
2 .. , ............ 6 11 5 12 10 10 4 5 4 22 26 19 
3 .... , .......... 4 5 3 6 6 6 3 2 1 13 13 10 
4 ••••••••• , ••• o' 0 0 0 7 6 5 0 0 0 7 6 5 
5 ............ -" 0 0 0 3 6 3 0 0 0 3 6 6 
7 ............... 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total .::::::::::::: :22 30 21 29 28 25 9 8 6 60 66 52 
Percent ........ .37 45 40 48 42 48 15 13 12 100 100 100 
a G denotes the problem setting with good weather certain. 
b P denotes the problem setting with poor weather certain. 
• E denotes the problem setting with either good or poor weather possible. 
solutions. As previously mentioned, the theoretical 
solutions were obtained by applying the relevant 
decision criteria to the normative payoff matrix of 
each problem. For each problem setting, the total 
number of farmers within each solution classification 
is shown at the bottom of table 15. These totals are 
also given as a percentage of the total number of 
problems in each setting. Comparison of these per-
centages within each qualitative grouping indicates 
that little variation existed between problem settings. 
The reason for this is that, in most cases, a farmer's 
solutions for all three problem settings fell into the 
same qualitative class. 
Averaged over each problem setting, 41 percent 
of the farmers' solutions coincided exactly with the 
theoretical solution; in addition, 46 percent of the 
farmers' solutions overlapped the theoretical solution. 
These were cases where the farmer selected a mixed 
strategy that included the optimal act as a component. 
For only 13 percent of the problems were the farmer 
and theoretical solutions disjunct. Obviously, the re-
spondents tended to select, at least as a part of their 
program, the alternative suggested by the theoretical 
procedures. But, as the following discussion of table 
15 indicates, this does not imply that the theories 
played any extensive descriptive role. 
Of the 155 farmer solutions that coincided with 
the theoretical solution, 24 percent were necessarily 
correct because they related to "probleIDS" involving 
only a single feeder program. Another 35 percent of 
these 155 farmer solutions related to farmers who 
considered only two alternatives. Only in one case out 
of the 36 in which mOre than three acts were con-
sidered was a strategy corresponding exactly to the 
theoretical solution chosen. Moreover, in the majority 
of those cases where the farmer's solution overlapped 
the theoretical solution, the optimal act was only of 
minor importance in the farmer's solution. Nor was 
there any significant correspondence evident between 
the farmers' approaches to the short-run hypothetical 
decision problems (which correspond best in time in-
fluence to the practical problems) and the classifica-
tion of the farmers' solutions in table 15. Also, the 
solutions of those 24 farmers who considered more 
than one state of Nature did not correspond to the 
theoretical solutions to any greater extent than was 
evident for the other members of the panel. Purposive 
selection by the respondents, based on calculations 
akin to those involved in our construction of the pay-
off matrices and application of the decision algorithms, 
appears unlikely. As is shown in the following para-
graphs, a similar conclusion must be drawn from 
analysis of those problems not containing a dominant 
act. Also, for both solution groups, this conclusion 
remains true when the Wald and Savage approach 
solutions based on only pure strategy selection are 
allowed. 
Forty-seven of the 225 problems had payoff matrices 
such that the Laplace, Wald and Savage criteria 
solutions were not identical. The farmers' solutions 
to these problems are classified in terms of their agree-
ment with the theoretical solutions in table 16. In 
making this tabulation, the farmer's solution was 
regarded as coinciding with the theoretical if it in-
cluded the acts of the normative solution in propor-
tions within the range YI + 0.10, where YI is the 
fraction of resources that should be devoted to the 
ith act. The range + 0.10 allows for possible errors of 
estimation in both farmer and normative solutions-
errors deriving from possible inaccuracies in the data 
used to calculate production costs. While the range 
of + 0.10 is arbitrary, it is considered reasonable. 
TABLE 16. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FARMERS AND THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
IN THOSE CASES WHERE ALL THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS WERE NOT IDENTICAL. 
Number Number of caseS in which farmer's Total number of 
of alter-. solution in agreement with: cases in which 
natives Laplace Wold Savage None of the all theoretical 
consid- solution solution solution theoretical solutions were 
ered solutions not identical 
Ga p. EC G P E G P E G P E G P E 
1 .......... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 .......... 2 0 1 2 1 4 Id 2d I" 5 3 7 9 5 12 
3 .. , .... '" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 4 
4 .......... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 
5 .......... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 3 
7 . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 •••••••• 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total ....... 2 0 1 2 1 4 I d 2d 3d 11 7 16 15 9 23 
• G denotes the problem setting with good weather certain. 
b P denotes the problem setting with poor weather certain • 
• E denotes the problem setting with either good or poor weather possible. 
d Including one problem already listed under agreement with the Wald .olution. 
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Inspection of table 16 reveals that only 16 of the 
47 farmer solutions or descriptive actions coincided 
with a normative solution of the theoretical criteria 
detailed in a previous section. Fourteen of these in-
stances were for problems involving only two acts. 
Of these 14 problems, 12 had theoretical solutions 
involving both alternatives in approximately equal 
proportions. The farmers may have tended to allocate 
their resources in smiliar proportions as a simple 
compromise between the two alternatives. The norma-
tive solutions to the other four of the 16 problems 
involved only pure acts. Coincidence between the 
farmer selections and the theoretical solutions could 
again have been due to chance. Given the data of 
table 16, this seems most likely. Also, no significant 
correspondence existed between the farmers' solutions 
to the hypothetical short-run decision problems and 
their solutions to the practical problems. This supports 
the contention that the farmers' analyses of the prac-
tical problems were not based on considerations akin 
to those used in deriving the normative solutions. 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
Wp, cannot say that the Laplace, Wald and Savage 
theories played any significant descriptive role in 
relation to the normative payoff matrices for the 
practical problems. This contrasts with the fact that 
in the hypothetical decision problems a majority of 
the farmers did tend to use a Laplace or Wald type 
of approach. Probably a multitude of factors contri-
bute to this discrepancy. Only the three possible 
causes hypothesized as the most important will be 
discussed here, however. 
Profit maximization. Profit maximization has been 
assumed to dominate the decision maker's appraisal 
of his problem. Perhaps this assumption is too strong. 
For instance, some of the decision makers may have 
preferences between alternative acts based on non-
monetary characteristics of the acts. Others may 
gamble for its own sake. 
Strangeness of the model. As shown previously, 
only a minor proportion of the farmers approached 
the decision problem in a manner similar to that 
postulated by the normative model. The "strangeness" 
of the constructed decision problem with its implicit 
use of the model may have confused some of the 
respondents. 
Calculation difficulties. Normative payoff matrices 
were used in the comiJarisons. As shown in Appendix 
B, the development of these matrices involved a series 
of cumbersome calculations. Implicitly, we assumed 
that the respondents could also make these calcula-
tions, or rule-of-thumb approximations of them, or 
"know intuitively from previous experience the adjust-
ments that had to be made. This is an extremely 
strong assumption. Its lack of fulfillment is probably 
the major cause for the high degree of irrationality 
suggested in the farmers' solutions. The fact that the 
farmers did not make the transformations from ex-
pected prices to expected profits correctly, however, 
does not necessarily vitiate the descriptive role of 
the theories. The farmers may have been using the 
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theories, not in relation to the normative payoff 
matrices, but in terms of some naive set of payoffs. 
Naive payoffs. The simplest such hypothesis is that 
the farmers made their choices simply in terms of the 
expected buying and selling prices of the cattle-
taking no account of intermediate production costs. 
To test this hypothesis, payoff matrices were con-
structed for each problem in terms of the margins 
between expected buying and selling prices for each 
alternative. The farmers' solutions were checked 
against the theoretical solutions for this naive formula-
tion of the decision problems. Again no significant 
correspondence was found between the theoretical 
and farmer solutions, nor between the farmer's solu-
tions to the practical problems and their decision-
making approach to the short-run hypothetical iJrob-
lems. Hence, the hypothesis must be dismissed. 
. Habitual selection. An alternative hypothesis is that 
the farmers did not solve the constructed problem 
in an active way. Perhaps they had a rather fixed 
feeder-cattle operation from year to year which they 
nominated as their solution to the problem. As a test 
of this hypothesis, the farmers' solutions to the prac-
tical problems were checked against the history of 
their feeder enterprises during two previous years. 
The 13 farmers who considered only a single alter-
native were excluded from this phase of the analysis. 
Of the remaining 62 farmers, 21 percent had solu-
tions to the practical problems coinciding either ex-
actly or very closely with their actual feeder programs 
over the two previous years. They apparently made 
their feeder-cattle decisions on a habitual basis; when 
confronted with the practical decision problem they 
had probably reiterated the habitual solution. It ap-
pears certain that for these 13 farmers, and for the 13 
who considered only a single alternative, the decision 
theories on which we have elaborated played no de-
scriptive role in the short run of a single season. It 
. may be that the theories played some role over the 
longer run for these farmers in initially determining 
their habitual decision; more likely, though, their 
original longer run decision was based on an aspira-
tion level approach of the Simon type. Perhaps they 
found a feeder-enterprise pattern that was initially 
satisfactory and simply maintained this same pattern, 
without seeking better alternatives. 
The 49 respondents whose feeder operation varied 
within the two prior seasons in general nominated 
solutions that (a) varied over the three problem 
settings and (b) were, in consequence, usually dif-
ferent from either of their two historical selections. 
These farmers, therefore, probably approached the 
practical problems in an active manner. Moreover, 
they constitute the bulk of population. On these 
grounds, we cannot dismiss the theories as pbying 
no role with respect to the practical problems. 
NORMATIVE ROLE OF THE THEORIES OF CHOICE: 
PRACI1CAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
The average expected annual percent net returns 
from the farmer, Laplace, Wald and Savage solutions 
for each state of Nature in each problem setting are 
shown in table 17. Inspection of the table reveals 
that these returns differ little from state to state within 
each solution. Also, only relatively small differences 
exist between the average payoffs for the Laplace, 
Wald and Savage solutions. Given the prevalence of 
dominant alternatives, this is not unexpected. The out-
standing feature of the data is the difference between 
the farmer and normative solutions. For every state 
of Nature in every problem setting, the average ex-
pected payoff from the farmer solution is markedly 
smaller than that from any of the three nonnative 
solutions. 
Assuming the survey panel to be a random sample, 
F tests based on analysis of variance (using designed 
comparisons among the means of table 17) indicated 
that the differences between the farmer and theoret-
ical solution means were highly significant, also that 
Significant differences did not exist among the theoret-
ical solution means. 
Table 18 lists the magnitude of the average dis-
crepancies between the farmer and normative solu-
tion payoffs. The percentage increase in net return 
that would be expected if the normative strategy had 
been selected rather than the farmers' nominated 
solution is shown in table 19. Obviously the decision 
theories examined do have practical normative import 
ex ante. Nothing can be said of their role in reducing 
ex post resource misallocation. The extent to which 
they did so would depend on the correctness of the 
farmers' price expectations. 
Table 19 also suggests that the three normative 
theories do not differ greatly in the extent to which 
they reduce resource misallocation ex ante, as would 
be expected given the data of table 17. Some note-
worthy differences do exist, however. In the problem 
setting with specification of good weather certain, the 
average expected payoffs from the Wald and Savage 
solutions are dominated by those from the Laplace 
solutions. With poor weather assured, the Wald ap-
proach is dominated. On the other hand, with weather 
unspecified, the Savage approach is inferior to the 
Laplace and Wald algorithms. That the Laplace solu-
tions are never dominated, while the Wald and Savage 
are, is not surprising because the latter are con-
servative approaches. 
The data cf table 19 can also be interpreted as an 
indication of the extent to which the survey farmers 
tended to be irrational, assuming profit maximization 
as their goal. Table 20 gives a better indication of the 
degree of irrationality that prevailed. It presents 
frequency distributicns of the discrepancies between 
the farmer and Laplace criterion solutions under each 
TABLE 17. AVERAGE EXPECTED ANNUAL PERCENT NET RE-
TURN UNDER EACH STATE OF NATURE FOR THE FARMER, 
LAPLACE, WALD AND SAVAGE SOLUTIONS OF THE PRACTICAL 
DECISION PROBLEMS." 
Good weather Poor weather Either good or poor 
Solution certain certain weather possible 
;o;-_____ .S, S3 '-S-" -5. S-,-S,--S3--S, 
Farmer .... 20~5~19.0--18.0-18.9--20.1-19~9-18.1-18.i 
Laplace ....... 25.4 23.8 23.5 22.9 24.9 23.8 23.4 22.9 
Wald ....... 25.2 23.8 23.0 23.0 24.8 23.9 23.0 22.8 
Savage 25.2 23.8 23.3 23.0 24.8 23.8 22.9 22.5 
• Pereent net return on purchase ,rice -of cattle' a~fe-;;'drequired to 
finish them. 
TABLE 18. AVERAGE GAIN IN EXPECTED ANNUAL PERCENT 
NET RETURN UNDER EACH STATE OF NATURE THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IF THE FARMERS USED THE LAPLACE, WALD OR 
SAVAGE CRITERIA: 
Criterion 
Good weather Poor weather Either good or poor 
certain certain weather possible 
-S-, --S;- -S-.--S' ·-S,--S;------s.----s.--
L'-,,-p'la-c-e -.-.-. -4'.9 4.8---5.5--4.0---4-:S-3.9-5.3-4:8 
Wald 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.1 4.7 4.0 4.9 4.7 
Savage 4.7 4.8 5.3 4.1 4.7 3.9 4.8 4.4 
TABLE 19. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN EXPECTED 
ANNUAL PERCENT NET RETURN UNDER EACH STATE OF 
NATURE THAT WOULD OCCUR IF THE FARMERS USED THE 
LAPLACE, W ALD OR SAVAGE CRITERIA. 
Good weather Poor weather Eith'cr good or poor 
Criterion certain certain weather possible 
-.-----;-__ ~,Sl S2 S. S. S, 52 S3 S. 
Laplace 23:9--25.~0.5-21~23-:9i9.6 29.3 26.5 
Wald .22.9 25.3 27.8 21.7 23.4 20.1 27.0 26.0 
Savage 22.9 25.3 29.4 21.7 23.4 19.6 26.5 24.3 
TABLE 20. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE CHANGE IN 
EXPECTED ANNUAL PERCENT NET RETURN THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IF THE FARMERS USED TUE LAPLACE CRITERION. 
Good POOT Either good or poor 
Interval weather weather weather possible 
certain certain 
-S~2 -S-3-S~ ~s-;;--sI 
-15.0 to -10.1 1 
-10.0 to -5.1 1 1 
-5.0 to -0.1 2 6 1 4 3 10 2 5 
0.0 to 4.9 40 43 43 47 40 42 41 43 
5.0 to 9.9 15 10 17 13 17 14 19 19 
10.0 to 14.9 13 10 7 4 6 3 6 1 
15.0 to 19.9 3 1 3 3 2 2 4 3 
20.0 to 24.9 2 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 
25.0 to 29.9 1 1 1 1 1 
30.0 to 34.9 1 2 1 
35.0 to 39.9 
40.0 to 44.9 
state of Nature. Had they used the Laplace criterion. 
17 percent of the farmers would, on the average,. 
have increased their expected net return by 10 or 
more percentage points; 6 percent of the fanners: 
would have decreased their net return. Because the 
frequencies for the Wald and Savage criteria follow 
essentially the same pattern, they are not presented. 
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SUMMARY AND LIMITATIONS 
This study refers to decisions made with respect 
to cattle feeding by a group of Iowa farmers. It 
represents an attempt to evaluate certain decision 
models and theories as they either (a) explain the 
procedures which farmers do use in making decisions 
under unc~rtainty or (b) provide procedures which 
farmers should use in decision making under certain 
problem· settings involving uncertainty and relative 
to the end of profit attainment. In economic term-
inology, (a) refers to the possible descriptive role, 
the explanation of actual actions taken by farmers, 
of the various theories; (b) refers to the normative 
role, the actions farmers should take relative to parti-
cular goals, of the theories. 
Real-world economic decisions are clouded by un-
certainty about the future. This study has been con-
cerned with decisions made under uncertainty, the 
decision maker having no objective knowledge of the 
likelihood of occurrence of the possible outcomes of 
his decision. He knows only what outcomes may occur. 
Assuming an economic hierarchy of the type and 
magnitude generally found in the real-world, several 
general game theoretic models of the production de-
cision problem facing an entrepreneur appeared un-
satisfactory. By considering a situation involving a 
large number of entrepreneurs whose production de-
cisions interact and all of whom have only human 
capabilities for solving problems, however, a more 
satisfactory specific model was derived. Essentially, 
this model was normative, being postulated as the 
most rational way for the entrepreneur to view his 
production decision problem. It corresponded to the 
real-world situation by assuming that the decision 
maker simplifies his choice problem to a degree com-
patible with his mental capabilities, appraising only 
some subset of his available acts and confining his 
attention to a small number of states of Nature. 
(Nature, as here used, is explained in the text.) These 
states of Nature were specified as broad aggregative 
maneuvers possible on the part of his opponents con-
sidered in aggregate. This model is one of absolute 
uncertainty where opponents are so numerous that 
their individual actions cannot be assessed. 
Using the conshucted model, an empirical assess-
ment of the normative and descriptive roles of the 
several theories of choice relevant to uncertainty 
was made. Theories which are primarily normative 
include those of Laplace, Wald, Savage and Hurwicz. 
Since they represent simple algorithms, however, it is 
not implausible that these theories might have de-
scriptive value or actual use by farmers. The theorie3 
of Simon and Shackle are purely descriptive and 
have no normative connotation. These theories are 
examined relative to decisions and choices specified 
by farmers to determine whether they are descriptive 
in the sense of typifying procedures which farmers 
do use. 
For this empirical analysis, data were collected dur-
ing 1956-57 by way of a four-stage personal interview 
panel survey. The panel was composed of a popula-
tion of 77 respondents, all of whom: (1) were farming 
in Marshall County, Iowa; (2) were between 30 and 
50 years of age in June 1957; (3) had owned and 
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operated at least 80 acres of farmland during the 
3 years prior to June 1957; (4) had fed an average 
of at least 25 feeder cattle in each of the three feed-
ing seasons prior to the survey; and (5) had cooperat-
ed in all stages of the survey. 
These restrictions were used to ensure having a 
group of respondents familiar with the cattle-feeding 
enterprise, the empirical analysis being based upon 
the decision problem facing a farmer within the 
feeder-cattle enterprise at the pre-purchase planning 
stage of a given season. This decision problem could 
be incorporated in the postulated normative model 
mentioned earlier. In the first stage of the empirical 
analysis, however, the comparison of farmer choices 
with the characteristics or elements of the model, 
examination of the farmers' responses revealed that 
only 12 out of the 77 could be said fairly certainly 
to consider the decision problem in the exact fashion 
postulated by the specified model. For another three 
farmers, the model was probably descriptively cor-
rect. In its entirety, therefore, the model had exact 
or complete descriptive value for only a small pro-
portion of the population. But a majority of the 
farmers did behave in partial agreement with the 
model. All considered some simplified subset of the 
alternatives available to them; 58 specified as a 
primary factor influencing their choice a factor com-
patible with the theoretical specification of the model; 
24 of the respondents made allowances for outcome 
variations over two or more states of Nature. 
In the second stage of the empirical analysis, de-
signed to assess the possible normative and descriptive 
roles of the several decision theories, the respondents 
were asked to solve two sets of decision problems 
under absolute uncertainty. The first of these sets 
consisted of four hypothetical problems. The farmers' 
solutions to these problems, together with reasons for 
their choices, indicated that probably only the Wald 
and Laplace theories .had significant descriptive value. 
Only a minority of the farmers consistently used the 
same approach for solutions to each of the hypothet-
ical decision problems. Evidently the decision ap-
proach used and, consequently, the choice made de-
pend to a large extent on the setting of the decision 
problem. In this regard, income was more important 
than the time influence in determining the decision 
approach to be used or suggested. Consistent use of 
a Wald type of approach tended to be associated 
with farmers having a low level of total capital in-
vestment and a high equity ratio. On the average, 
respondents using the Wald approach were also the 
older and least educated members of the population. 
Those who always used the Laplace algorithm gener-
ally had the most years of formal education, a relative-
ly high net worth and a low equity ratio. In contrast 
to farmers using only a Wald or a Laplace approach 
were those who switched between these two pro-
cedures as the setting of the decision problem varied. 
Generally, they were younger, employed more capital 
and had more dependents. They were numerically 
more important than either of the groups using only 
a Wald or a Laplace approach. 
The other set of problems analyzed in the second 
stage of the empirical analysis was practical. These 
problems related to a real-world, rather than a hypo-
thetical, situation. Each respondent was asked for 
data relevant to his pre-purchase decision problem 
within the feeder-cattle enterprise. Given this data, 
the farmer was asked for his solutions to this problem 
when it was posed in three different contexts. Again, 
from comparison of the farmers solutions and the 
solutions for the theoretic approaches to these practi-
cal problems, nothing could be said of a general de-
scriptiverole of the theories per se. It was apparent 
that the theories played no descriptive role in terms 
of the normative model underlying the construction 
of these practical problems. In contrast, however, the 
theories appeared to have important normative im-
plications for decisions on cattle feeding. Within the 
setting of the practical problems, the respondents 
would have been able to increase their expected pro-
fits by at least 21 percent, as an average, if they had 
used the Laplace, Wald or Savage procedures. 
Several limitations of the empirical analysis of 
farmers' decisions in relation to decision models and 
game theories presented here should be noted. First, 
profit maximization was assumed to be the dominant 
goal. Ideally, utility maximization would have been a 
more relevant assumption, but its measurement also 
would have been impractical. Second, the empirical 
analysis assumed that the respondent's solution to a 
constructed decision problem corresponded exactly 
with the decision and resultant action he would have 
taken if faced with the same problem in real life. 
This correspondence may not always be true. Third, 
the respondents were only asked to solve each decision 
problem once. Had they been asked to solve the 
problems at other points in time they may have 
given different answers. Fourth, the empirical analysis 
related, in strict terms, only to a population of 77 
farmers. Moreover, much of the study revolved around 
but one of the many production decision problems 
faced by these entrepreneurs. 
APPENDIX A: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 
The mean and range of some selected attributes of 
the survey farmers are shown in the accompanying 
tables. Personal characteristics are summarized in 
table A-I, financial data in table A-2 and farm organ-
ization characteristics in table A-3. 
A wide range is evident for a majority of the char-
acteristics. With the exception of equity, which h"ls 
a slightly negatively skewed distribution, all of the 
attributes listed in tables A-2 and A-3 have a fre-
quency distribution that is strongly positively skewed. 
Typical is the distribution of operated acres. It is as 
follows: 
Acres operated Number of farmers 
80-99 ......... , . . . . . .. 3 
100-199 ................. 24 
200-299 ................. 21 
300-399 ................. 17 
400-499 ................. 7 
500-599 ................. 3 
1,100 .................. 1 
1,820 .................. 1 
TABLE A-I. SELECTED PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
POPULATION, MEAN AND RANGE. 
Item Unit Mean Range 
Low High 
Age .......................... year 
Dependents .................. number 
Education: School .............. year 
42.1 31 50-
3.6 0 7 
11.0 4 12 
College ............. year 
Total . . ............ year 
0.6 0 5 
11.6 4 17 
Other experience: Nonfarm ...... year 
Farm laborer ... year 
2.0 0 25 
4.8 0 16 
Tenant ........ year 5.7 0 26 
Experience as owner-operator .... year 11.4 3 27 
TABLE A-2. SELECTED FlNANClAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
POPULATION: MEAN AND RANGE. 
Item Unit 
Invested capital: 
Land and buildings ........... $1,000 
MachinelY ................... $1,000 
Livestock ................... $1,000 
Other capital .. . ............ $1,000 
Total capital investment ......... $1,000 
Bo..,.owed capital: 
Land, bulidings and machinelY . $1,000 
Livestock .. . .. , ......... $1,000 
Other (Unsecured capital) .... $1,000 
Total borrowed capital .......... $1,000 
Equity ratio .................... percent 
Gross farm income ............. $1,000 
Mean 
72.8 
11.1 
18.2 
31.5 
133.6 
9.5 
3.2 
2.8 
15.5 
88.4 
41.9 
Range 
Low High 
5.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.3 
20.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
52.6 
8.0 
450.0 
50.0 
140.0 
805.0 
1,300.0 
56.0 
26.0 
30.0 
102.0 
100.0 
442.0 
TABLE A-3. CROP AND LlVESTOCK PROGRAMS FOLLOWED BY 
THE POPULATION: MEAN AND RANGE. 
Item Unit Mean Range 
Low High 
291.4 80 1,820 
239.3 80 1,820 
52.1 0 335 
Land operated ................. acre 
Owned ..................... acre 
Rented ..................... acre 
Land use: 
145.5 0 900 
8.4 0 63 
8.7 0 200 
Grain ..................... acre 
Soybeans .................... acre 
Silage ....................... acre 
Hay ........................ acre 43.1 0 200 
Rotation pasture .............. acre 24.9 0 500 
24.1 0 285 
11.8 2 110 
266.6 80 1,820 
Permanent pasture ............ acre 
Homesteads, lots and waste ...... acre 
Total ..................... acre 
Livestock: 
32.4 0 100 
137.4 9 1,200 
67.3 0 900 
63.6 0 817 
6.5 0 140 
6.9 0 57 
2.6 0 40 
Pig litters .................. number 
Feeder cattle purchased ........ number 
Calves ................. , number 
Yearlings ................. number 
20-year-old. . ............... number 
Beef cows .................. number 
Milking cows .. ....... . .. number 
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APPENDIX B: 
DERIVATION OF NORMATIVE PAYOFF 
MATRICES FOR THE PRACTICAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
As pointed out in the text, rational analysis of the 
decision problem n;::cessitates that the elements of 
the payoff matrix be comparable. Comparability was 
achieved by using as payoff elements the annual 
percent net return expected from each of the con-
sidered feeder program alternatives under each pos-
sible state of Nature. These percent returns were 
calculated for each farmer as follows: 
Denote by: 
alj : the expected annual percent net return on 
investment in alternative Alo if the state of Nature Sj 
should prevail. 
Plj : the farmer's expected selling price at the 
farm in cents per pound liveweight of fat cattle from 
Alo if Sj occurs. 
Clj : the estimated cost of production in cents 
per pound liveweight of fat cattle from Ai 0 if Sj 
occurs. 
ei : the farmer's proportionate equity in the 
capital invested in Alo if Ale is selected. This figure 
could not be ascertained precisely. As an approxima-
tion, the farmer's estimate of his year-to-year average 
equity ratio for his feeder-cattle enterprise was used. 
r : the maximum annual percent net return 
which the farmer felt certain of receiving from altern a-
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tive investment of his feeder-enterprise capital during 
the period of the year when it is free for investment 
elsewhere. 
s : the proportion of the farmer's equity in his 
feeder-enterprise capital that he normally invests 
elsewhere when it is not invested in feeder cattle. 
tl : the fraction of the year during which the 
farmer's feeder-enterprise capital is free for invest-
ment elsewhere. 
ml : the length of feeder program Aloin months. 
The payoff elements were then calculated for each 
farmer by the follOWing formulas: 
Plj - Cij 12 100 if ml ;;:: 12, alj = Clj ml -C 
Plj - Clj + cljelrstl 100 
aij = 1" if ml < 12. Clj 
While reinvestment of the farmer's personal capital 
in the off-feeder season was common, only one farmer 
reinvested borrowed capital. The net return from 
this investment was included in the calculation of his 
payoff matrix. 
